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law of one price. Since the relationship should be statistically insignificant or very
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in the analysis. The price-income relationship is found to be strong over the whole
time span considered, thus indicating that the Russian market is not near to being
integrated even in the present day. Nevertheless, integration tends to improve
over time, though there are deviations from this tendency in 1997 and 1999. A
number of culprits behind market fragmentation are identified, organized crime
among them.
Keywords: Russia, law of one price, market integration, price dispersion,
Russian regions.
Acknowledgements. The author is grateful to Michael Alexeev,
Stanislav Anatolyev, Michael Beenstock, Erik Berglöf, Daniel Berkowitz,
Konstantin Kozlov, Mark Schaffer, and Alexander Tsyplakov for useful discussions
and comments. Thanks also to David Brown for generously providing data,
and to Alexei Abramov and Elena Suslova for research assistance.
Konstantin Gluschenko
Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering,
Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences
17 Lavrentieva prospect, 630090 Novosibirsk, Russia
Tel. +7 (3832) 30 25 48





2. THEORETICAL GROUND 9
2.1. A Cross-Sectional Test of the Law of One Price 9
2.2. The Problem of Non-tradable Inputs 16
3. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY AND DATA 18
3.1. Econometrics 18
3.2. Data 20
3.3. Robustness Checks 22
4. PATTERN OF RUSSIA'S MARKET INTEGRATION 24
4.1. Relationship between Price and Demand Differences 24
4.2. Summary and Discussion 44
5. CULPRITS BEHIND MARKET FRAGMENTATION 47
5.1. Potential Culprits 47
5.2. Organized Crime and Prices 50
5.3. Empirical Results 53
6. CONCLUSIONS 60
APPENDICES 61
A. Distribution Costs of Retail Trade 61
B. Composition and Structure
of the Baskets of 19 and 25 Basic Food Goods 62
C. Retail-Wholesale Margin vs. Food Basket Costs 63
D. Retail-Wholesale Margin vs. Spatial Price Indices 66
E. Individual Food Goods                         67
F. Individual Industrial Goods         73
G. Prices vs. Various Factors             77
REFERENCES                            91
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 5
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
In Russian economic and related literature, much ink is being spilled over
the "single economic space." Although a different meaning is read into the
notion of single economic space, it is believed that everybody would agree
that the notion should, at least, imply the absence of artificial impediments
to inter-regional trade, or, in other words, it should imply integration of the
Russian market. If so, differences in commodity prices between regions
should be dictated only by transportation costs, that is, the law of one
price must hold. Indeed, some studies have found inter-regional price
gaps caused by the 1992 liberalization shock to be diminishing with time.
But along with this, there are various reasons for doubting that the Russian
economic space has really become "single." The pattern of inter-regional
price dispersion more closely resembles that of an international economic
union rather than that of a single country.
Therefore a number of questions arise. Has the Russian consumer mar-
ket become integrated? If this is not the case, then what is its develop-
mental tendency, that is, is it moving towards integration, or is it
becoming more regionally fragmented? And what impedes market inte-
gration? These are the questions that this paper attempts to answer.
As it follows from the law of one price, in an integrated market economy,
the price for a good in some region cannot depend on the demand in
this region, since a rise in the price caused by an increase of the quan-
tity demanded would be immediately forced down by an inflow of the
good from other regions where its price is lower. Properly speaking, this
indicates that the market of a country is single; otherwise, it is nothing
more than a collection of loosely bounded regional markets. Hence, tak-
ing into account transportation costs and distribution costs (which are
region-specific, in particular, dependent on wages in retail trade), there
should not be a relationship between the dispersion of prices and de-
mand among regions of the country. If a relationship exists, this sug-
gests that the market is not integrated. Thus, the strength of the rela-
tionship can measure the extent of integration: the stronger the
relationship, the weaker integration.
Based on this theoretical ground, a statistical analysis of price dispersion
among 74 Russian regions is performed. Regional per capita income is
used as a proxy of demand, and the distance between the capital cities
of the regions is used as a proxy of transportation costs. Statistical esti-
mations are carried out for each year of the period 1992 – 1999, thus
providing an evolving pattern of changes in integration.
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The analysis reveals a rather strong relationship between the differences
in prices and incomes during the entire time span considered. If the re-
gions with difficult access (such as Yakutia, Kamchatka, etc.) are elimi-
nated, the relationship weakens but still remains significant. The market
of European Russia (without its northern regions) would be expected to
be much more integrated, since the distances between regions are rela-
tively short here, and the transportation infrastructure is far better devel-
oped. Surprisingly, it turns out that this is not the case. In general, the
pattern provides evidence of poor integration of the consumer market of
the country; it is premature to speak of the Russian economic space as
being "single."
However, there are encouraging features in the pattern as well. Frag-
mentation of the market was increasing until the end of 1994, and then it
has been permanently decreasing, excluding 1997 and 1999. It can be
argued that since about 1994 – 1995, the integration of the internal mar-
ket of Russia tends, in general, to be improving.
Reasons for poor market integration are rather numerous, among them
regional protectionism, the lack of information on trade opportunities,
organized crime, etc. To evaluate their importance, the analysis has
been augmented to include those of them that are quantifiable. They are
the quality of the transportation infrastructure, intra-regional transport
costs, subsidies, price regulations (for foods), "shuttle trade" (for indus-
trial goods), and organized crime.
A positive relationship between price dispersion and the difference in the
quality of the infrastructure takes place for the most part only when the
difficult-to-access regions are involved in the analysis, and a positive re-
lationship between differences in prices and intra-regional transportation
costs is found when these regions are, vice versa, eliminated. What is
unexpected is that the relationship between state intervention in the re-
gional economy — subsidies and price regulations — and price disper-
sion turns out to be mostly negative. That is, under contemporary Rus-
sian conditions, state intervention in the economy facilitates (on average)
the narrowing of inter-regional price gaps. At the same time, "shuttle
trade," quite to the contrary, widens them. At last, organized crime suffi-
ciently impedes market integration, widening price dispersion. Although,
the impact of this factor is weakening with time, the effect of organized
crime peaked about 1993 – 1995.
The results obtained provide hope that the Russian internal market is
moving towards integration. Unfortunately, the movement is slow and not
steady. There are serious artificial barriers to inter-regional trade, and
special efforts are needed to remove them.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As market institutions are developing in Russia, one might expect that
price divergence across regions of the country (which has been caused
by the price liberalization of 1992) should give place to the convergence
of prices. Indeed, some studies (see below) have found that price differ-
ences across Russian regions are diminishing over time.
But, on the other hand, there is abundant evidence that the "single eco-
nomic space" — much ink has been spilling over which — is as yet a kind
of poetical metaphor rather than reality. For example, in December 1999,
the cost of the basket of 25 basic food goods varied 1.7-fold across the
regions of European Russia (without its northern territories): from 76% of
the Russian average in the Ulyanovsk Oblast to 132% in Moscow. Spatial
consumer price indices calculated by Surinov (1999) show that the dis-
persion range of the food price level across these regions was equal to
32% in January 1998 (Moscow vs. the Kaliningrad Oblast), and that of
the industrial goods level was 62% (with the Smolensk Oblast and the
Stavropol Krai as the low and high ends, respectively). This more closely
resembles the pattern of an international economic union (e.g., Morgan,
1998 estimates food price differences across the Euro-zone as ranging
up to 1.43) than the pattern of a single country.
Therefore a number of questions arise. Has the Russian consumer mar-
ket become integrated? If not so, then what is its developmental ten-
dency, that is, is it moving towards integration, or is its regional frag-
mentation increasing?
The conventional approach of the law of one price testing with the use of
cointegration analysis can answer the first question, but it is impotent in
solving the second. The point is that the cointegration regressions pro-
vide an estimate which averages (in some sense) price behavior over the
entire time span considered, and so, fundamentally they are not able to
capture changes in the nature of the behavior during this span. But it is
just in a transitional economy where such changes are to be expected.
To face this problem, this paper puts forward a cross-sectional test of
the law of one price. The test consists of the estimation of a relationship
between price differences and demand differences — approximated by
income-per-capita differences — across Russian regions at a given point
in time. As it follows from the law of one price, this relationship should
be statistically insignificant (or, at least, very weak) in an integrated mar-
ket economy. Therefore, the strength of the relationship can be used to
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measure the degree of integration of a market. The temporal pattern is
provided by a sequence of cross-sectional estimations for a number of
points in time; and so, the analysis could be labeled as "quasidynamic."
For the statistical analysis, price data (prices of a number of aggregated
and individual consumer goods) with annual frequency are used. The
time span covered is 1992 through 1999; the cross-sectional samples in-
volve most (74 of the 89) regions of Russia.
The results obtained suggest that the Russian consumer market is far
from being integrated up to the present. The relationship between price
and income differences is found to be strong in many cases over the
whole time span considered, thus indicating sufficient barriers to inter-
regional trade. However, market fragmentation tends to diminish with
time. Generally, the relationship grows weaker over the years. Organized
crime is found to be one of the culprits behind the regional fragmenta-
tion of the Russian market.
This study relates to a number of papers devoted to market integration in
modern Russia. Gardner and Brooks (1994) as well as De Masi and
Koen (1995) examined the early stage of the transition. They found large
price differences across locations that could not be assigned to trans-
portation costs. At the same time, some indications were obtained that
these differences tended to decrease. More recently, Koen and De Masi
(1997) stated that price convergence across regions within a country
over time is one of the stylized facts and achievements observed in most
transition economies. Focusing on the comparison of state and market
prices, Berkowitz et al. (1998) have concluded that there is a linkage
between price behavior across Russian cities. With the use of a relation-
ship between price dispersion and distances, Berkowitz and DeJong
(1999) have found that there is a cluster of regions, the so-called Red
Belt, which accounts for a significant share of the market fragmentation;
controlling for this, the Russian economy operates in some sense like a
market economy.
Recently, Berkowitz and DeJong (2001) have studied temporal changes
in market integration in Russia, having based their study, again, on the
relationship mentioned. (The relation between the results of the current
study and those of Berkowitz and DeJong is discussed in Section 4.2).
Gluschenko (2001a) has tested the law of one price across West-
Siberian regions over 1992 – 1998 with the use of cointegration tech-
niques. The pattern obtained has been mixed; both convergence and di-
vergence of prices take place in this part of the Russian internal market.
The study also relates to empirical works examining the issue of the law
of one price in market economies, in particular, Parsley and Wei (1996),
Engel and Rogers (1996), Obstfeld and Taylor (1997).
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De Masi and Koen (1995) seem to be the first who noticed the relation-
ship between per capita incomes in regions and regional price levels in
Russia. However, they did not go into deeper analysis of this. Using 1995
prices of 10 food goods, Zarova and Prozhivina (1997) sought factors
determining the price level in a region. Among these, they found, like De
Masi and Koen before, a positive relationship between prices and aver-
age per capita income. But since their study totally ignores inter-regional
trade, the authors regarded the effect quite in order, and thus needing
no additional analysis or explanation.
However, neither theoretical nor empirical papers have been found that
relate closely to the approach adopted in this study, and at the same
time that concern a country with an advanced market economy, i.e., that
provide an analysis of the relationship between price dispersion and de-
mand (income) differences within such an economy. (Although, one sub-
plot in article by Engel and Rogers (1996) can be interpreted as relevant;
see Section 4.2.) It is very likely that the lack of such a relationship
seems to be so obvious that no economists have attended to its theo-
retical substantiation and empirical testing. This is cause for regret since
a comparison of the findings of this study with some relevant results for
a country with an advanced market economy (e.g., USA) would be very
desirable in order to judge the extent to which the behavior of the Rus-
sian economy deviates from the behavior of an economy believed to be
integrated.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the theoretical
grounding for a cross-sectional test of the law of one price is provided.
In Section 3, the econometric model and data used for the analysis are
described. Empirical results are reported in Section 4, and Section 5 is
concerned with impediments to market integration, providing both a dis-
cussion of additional variables and relevant empirical results. Conclu-
sions are drawn in Section 6. For technical reasons, Appendices E, F,
and G are not included in the printed version of the paper. They can be
found on the EERC web site (www.eerc.ru).
2. THEORETICAL GROUND
2.1. A Cross-Sectional Test of the Law of One Price
As it immediately follows from the law of one price, in a perfectly inte-
grated economy there should not be a persistent relationship between
the differences in prices of tradable goods and demand differences
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across locations. Demand shock in a given location provokes a local rise
in prices, but this, in turn, causes an increase in supply due to inter-
location commodity arbitrage, thus reducing the prices here; contempo-
raneously, arbitrage increases prices in locations where they are lower.
Let us consider a world with a perfectly integrated economy; by such is
meant an economy in which there are not any economic, physical, and
administrative obstacles to the movement of goods between any loca-
tions. The absence of economic obstacles implies, among other things,
that arbitrage is costless. The usual assumption of instantaneous arbi-
trage applies as well. Clearly, in such an ideal economy, the law of one
price holds at every instant since any infinitesimal deviation from the
equilibrium will be instantly eliminated by perfect arbitrage. Therefore the
perfectly integrated economy may be considered as an economy in
which the law of one price holds.
For the convenience of subsequent formalization, let us simplify our
world further. Let it consist of only two locations, r and s, and there is
only one good, the prices of which in these locations are denoted as Pr
and Ps. Both the markets are perfectly competitive. It is also supposed
that any possible demand as well as supply provided by local producers
are negligibly smaller in location r than those quantities in location s.
The interpretation is that r is some city or relatively small region of a
country, and s is the rest of this country. Arbitrage transaction costs per
unit of good (marginal costs of arbitrage) are denoted as Crs; since
arbitrage is perfect: Crs = 0. Income per capita, Ir, will be considered
as the only factor, besides price, determining demand in location r, so
that DrQ  = D(Pr, Ir); D(⋅,⋅) monotonically decreases in price, and mono-
tonically increases in income.
With these assumptions, supply in r will be absolutely elastic as any in-
crease in demand in r will be opposed by an instant inflow of good from
s, and a decrease will cause an instant outflow to s; thus the price in r is
permanently maintained to be on the level Pr = Ps (price Ps can be con-
sidered as constant without any loss of generality; in fact, a change in Ps
means a change in the overall price level in the country, and to eliminate
this, it is sufficient to take Ps as a numeraire). Fig. 1 illustrates different
equilibria in submarket r of a perfectly integrated market (S labeling the
supply curve).
As the figure clearly demonstrates, with perfect arbitrage the same price
Ps corresponds to each demand (hence, to income, Ir). Thus, the ab-
sence of the dependence of local prices on local demand (income) is a
necessary condition for the law of one price to hold (the same, though,
is valid for any other variable since the law is strictly formulated as
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Pr = Ps). Hence, any relationship between the relative price and demand
(income) in location r points to a violation of the law of one price, so in-
dicating that there are some barriers in the way of commodity flows be-
tween r and s, and thus that the economy is not integrated.
At this point, let us allow for such barriers. Barriers are considered as
fully characterized by arbitrage transaction costs Crs > 0 (this does not
decrease the generality as well, since with a broader notion of transac-
tion costs, these may also involve barriers of an non-economic nature,
e.g., administrative ones). In such an economy, arbitrage is no longer
able to equalize prices in r and s as arbitrage occurs only if the price
difference exceeds costs Crs, otherwise arbitrage turns out to be unprof-
itable. Fig. 2 illustrates the situation (SL labels the supply curve of pro-
ducers located in r).
As soon as demand becomes such that local producers would supply the
good at a price exceeding Ps + Crs, deliveries from s become profitable,
thus beating the price back down to Ps + Crs. Therefore total supply
turns out to be absolutely elastic in the section Qr ≥ Q+. When demand
falls to a quantity such that the good will have to be sold at a price below
Ps – Crs, the price fixes itself at the level Ps – Crs, since all quantities
that do not meet demand at this price can be exported to s, and be sold
at price Ps, losing Crs per unit of quantity. Thus, supply is absolutely
S
)( rID ′ )( rID ′′
)( rID ′′′




Fig. 1. Market equilibria in a local market with perfect
arbitrage.
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elastic in the section Qr ≤ Q– as well. If demand is such that the equilib-
rium price is confined between these bounds, Pr ∈ [Ps – Crs, Ps + Crs],
then both imports and exports are unprofitable. In this case, local produc-
ers supply the entire demand, and their entire output is sold in the local
market, the total supply coinciding with curve SL on segment [Q–, Q+].
Thus, a persistent difference in prices Pr and Ps appears (of course, if
prices do not accidentally coincide). The price of the good in r now turns
out to be dependent on demand, and hence, on income, Pr = f(Qr(Ir));
the equality Pr = Ps that represents the law of one price is substituted
with inequality Ps – Crs ≤ Pr ≤ Ps + Crs.
It is possible that a change in personal income in locality r affects not
only the demand side, but the supply side as well. For example, a rise in
personal income can be due to an increase in wages, and hence in pro-
duction costs. On the other hand, rising income could push up individu-
als' demand for land, so heightening their competition with producers in
the land market. As a consequence of this, marginal production costs will
grow, and the supply curve of local producers will change. The result will
be a decrease in Q– and Q+ (maybe, different) and a change in the sup-
ply curve's shape in segment [Q–, Q+]. However, as it is easy to see
from Fig. 2, this does not affect at all the conclusions drawn. (We could
even restrict our consideration to the short run in which the local supply
 
SL 







Fig. 2. Market equilibria in a local market with imperfect arbitrage
(Crs > 0). 
Pr 
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is absolutely inelastic. Then S becomes a staircase function; neverthe-
less, all conclusions still hold.)
Let us now start moving from our ideal world (even with its market fric-
tions) to the real one. To begin with, let us leave out the assumption of
instantaneous arbitrage. When arbitrage takes finite time, price shocks
will no longer be extinguished instantaneously and transient deviations of
price Pr from equilibrium value Ps become possible. Then the law of one
price should hold statistically; this can be represented, e.g., as
ln(Prt/Pst) = εrst     (t = 1, ..., T ), (1)
where t indexes time, and εrst is a random value with zero mean and fi-
nite variance. Taking into account the potential possibility of impediments
to arbitrage, it is reasonable to insert these into (1), thus obtaining
ln(Prt/Pst) = g(Irt) + εrst     (t = 1, ..., T ), (2)
where g(⋅) is the relevantly transformed function f(⋅); the function is as-
sumed to be the same at each t. The law of one price holds if (2) coin-
cides with (1), that is, if g(Irt) ≡ 0 (with the above-mentioned properties
of the equilibrium error εrst). In statistical terms, this means that the es-
timate of g(Irt) is insignificant.
Let us recall now that s is the entire country without r rather than a
monolithic "locality." Therefore we can isolate any one of this country's
locations as r; all the aforesaid holds for it provided that the condition of
"smallness" is met. Model (1) is valid for any location r at any time.
Therefore, once there is a set of various locations {r}, instead of a tem-
poral sample, a cross-sectional sample can be used for some fixed point
of time. Assuming g(⋅) to be uniform  for all locations, model (2) can be
rearranged to
ln(Pr/Ps) = g(Ir) + εrs     (r = 1, ..., R). (3)
Let us take two such locations, r1 and r2. Since expression (3) is valid
for each location, an analogous relation will connect them to one an-
other. The relation can be obtained formally by subtracting Equation (3)
for r1 and r2 from one another; Ps disappears with this. The difference
is that the function on the right-hand side becomes bivariate. For con-
venience, let us transform it into a univariate function h(⋅), taking the
ratio of incomes in r1 and r2 as the argument. The uniformity of h(⋅)
for any pair of locations is also assumed. In order not to complicate
the notation, the previous indexing of locations by r and s is restored.
Clearly the meaning of s changes with this; submarket s now becomes
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interchangeable with submarket r.1 Model (3) for locality pairs takes
the form
ln(Pr/Ps) = h(Ir/Is) + εrs   (r, s ∈ {( r, s) | r ≠ s }). (4)
This model (as well as (3)) is a tool for the cross-sectional test of the law
of one price. If estimation of h(⋅) is statistically insignificant, i.e., h(Ir/Is) ≡ 0,
the law may be believed to hold (with some reservations which will be
stated below). The other case, when the relationship between price dif-
ference and income (demand) difference is detected, suggests the fail-
ure of the law.
Unlike usual cointegration tests, which merely indicate whether the law of
one price holds or does not, the cross-sectional test provides the "de-
gree" of failure of the law. Statistical estimation of model (4) eventually
comes to the calculation of a linear parameter of a specific function, i.e.,
h(⋅) is represented as βH(⋅), where H(⋅) is a known function, and the value
of β is determined. If an economy is integrated, then β = 0. If it is not,
the preceding analysis suggests that β > 0. Therefore, the strength of
the relationship between prices and incomes, β, can measure the inte-
gration of the market, that is, the stronger the relationship, the weaker
the integration. A set of estimates of β for successive points of time
yields an evolving pattern of market integration, thus providing insight
into its evolution.
The situation when the price is within the "arbitrage inaction band"
(named so by Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997), [Ps – Crs, Ps + Crs], means
autarky, full closeness of market r. Such situations are not frequent in
reality; more likely one may expect the equilibrium point to fall on either
the left or right horizontal section of the supply curve (see Fig. 2). In a
location pair, the first case should occur in a "poorer" location and the
second case will be in a "richer" one (for comparability, both supply and
demand can be considered as per capita values). Then, in fact, depend-
ence of price dispersion on arbitrage transaction costs, Crs, rather than
on income dispersion takes place. However, since these costs are unob-
servable, it is just the dependence on income that will be seen; namely,
if a location is "richer," then the price is higher there. But if we can
quantify some components of arbitrage transaction costs, then this de-
pendence should weaken as the components are inserted in the model,
and it should disappear when the whole magnitude of these costs
                                               
1 The former "rest of the country," though behind the scenes, does implicitly act,
providing the horizontality of supply curves in both locations either along the
whole length of the curves (when Crs = 0) or in the sections of profitability of ar-
bitrage.
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(i.e., all their components) is included. This is a rather important consid-
eration.
Perfectly integrated economies do not exist, since every spatially dis-
persed market is segmented by physical distance. Due to this, arbitrage
transaction costs will always be nonzero because of the costs of ship-
ping goods. Then the question arises: what is a realistic integrated
economy? It seems that an economy in which there are no "artificial"
barriers to inter-locality trade, or at worst in which these barriers are very
low, can be accepted as integrated. This means that if model (4) or (3) is
augmented for transportation costs (commonly approximated by dis-
tances), then the dependence of price differences on income differences
should turn out to be insignificant — or, at least, very weak — in such an
economy. In other words, the economy is deemed to be (realistically)
integrated if the law of one price holds except for transportation costs.
Further step on the road to the real world includes the abandonment of
the assumption that there is the only good. With several goods, demand
turns out to be ambiguously related to income if for no other reason than
the substitution effect. Taking into account non-tradables complicates
the issue still more. For example, a rise in the price for services, which
takes the lead over income growth, can reduce the demand for goods,
and we will observe that prices for goods decrease while incomes in-
crease.2 Therefore it would be better to deal with the dependence of
prices not on incomes, but directly on demand. However this way is un-
realistic since direct demand indicators (as, e.g., sales quantities) are
unavailable. For this reason, per capita incomes nevertheless will be
used to characterize demand, bearing in mind that this is nothing more
than a proxy of demand for a good.
As indicated earlier, the absence of the dependence of local prices on
local demand (income) is a necessary condition for the law of one price
to hold. Why is this not a sufficient condition as well? The point is that
spatial price differences are not always determined by income differ-
ences. Let, e.g., a good not be produced in locality r at all, but be en-
tirely delivered from another part of the country, s. Then supply in r will
be absolutely elastic, as in Fig. 1, but nevertheless prices in r and s can
be different. This occurs when the supply curve is shifted upward from
price Ps. One portion of shift owes to costs of transportation from s to r,
this part is to be eliminated by the above-accepted convention. But dif-
ferent parts may take place, e.g., local sale tax.
                                               
2 Such a situation is rather probable in Russia because of sharp leaps in tariffs for
housing and utilities, prices for electricity, urban transportation fares, etc., which
occur asynchronously in various regions of the country.
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Spatial price differentiation, which is not related to local incomes, may
also take place during periods of high and unpredictable inflation, ren-
dering rational expectations impossible. One more reason is the low in-
tensity or lack of arbitrage activity that is peculiar to the beginning of
transition when market institutions were still being formed. Hence, the
cross-sectional test of the law of one price is to some degree "one-
sided." A negative result of the test guarantees the failure of the law
while a positive one does not provide full confidence that the law holds.
Therefore inference that a market is integrated drawn from the statistical
insignificance of β is conventional to some extent. In other words, a mar-
ket is deemed to be integrated in the sense of the adopted measure of
integration.
2.2. The Problem of Non-tradable Inputs
The dependence of local prices on local incomes superficially resembles
the Balassa – Samuelson effect. The effect is that rich countries tend to
have higher price levels than poor ones. However, the Balassa –
 Samuelson effect fundamentally relates to overall price level which
involves prices for services (it is the contribution of more expensive
services to this level in rich countries that causes the effect), and so,
seemingly it is unrelated to the prices of tradable goods. Nevertheless, a
linkage does exist, since goods considered as tradables contain, in fact,
a non-tradable component, namely, distribution and marketing services
(see, e.g., Rogoff, 1996; Engel and Rogers, 1995, 1996; etc.). The
difference in the prices of non-traded inputs between two locations
would give rise to a deviation from the law of one price, even if wholesale
prices of the good were equal in these locations.
To exemplify this, Appendix A provides the structure of the retail trading
costs in Russia for 1993 – 1998. From these data, it is seen that most of
the cost components should have location-specific prices (local ship-
ping, electricity, labor, etc.). Besides that, distribution services are highly
labor-intensive; direct remuneration of labor (including wage taxes) alone
comprises about half of the retail trading costs. Therefore, the contribu-
tion of the non-traded component to retail prices is likely to be higher in
richer locations (due to more expensive labor input), so causing an ef-
fect similar to the Balassa – Samuelson effect.
The prices of some other inputs may be dependent on local incomes as
well, e.g., rents (although in Russia they hardly play a noticeable role,
comprising, on the average, about 1% of the final prices of goods; see
Appendix A). Owing to this, even though a product market is perfectly
integrated and there are no transportation costs, price dispersion across
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locations would still be observed. To put it differently, the price differen-
tial term in (3) and (4) may pick up, in parallel with the local demand ef-
fects, variations in marketing cost as well.
There are two possible ways to deal with this problem. The first is to in-
terpret the difference in distribution costs as an indication of imperfect
integration. In fact, this means that the notion of market integration is
widened. That is, β will measure not only the integration of the goods
market as such, but also the integration of the market for non-traded
distribution services and of the labor market. Such a generalization is
quite meaningful, since marketing costs may not all be locality-specific.
For example, this is the case when there are nation-wide and/or multi-
region-wide department store chains and corporations' distribution net-
works, which is typical for counties with advanced market economies,
but is almost totally non-existent in contemporary Russia. Wide inter-
regional wage variations in the Russian trade sector mostly arise from
the high level of fragmentation of the labor market (the housing problem
being the key reason for the low geographical mobility of labor).
The benefits of this approach are a more comprehensive pattern of the
spatial price behavior in transition (though at the expense of going be-
yond the traditional interpretation of market integration), and less severe
demands on needed data; in particular, it is possible to dispense with
data on distribution costs. The disadvantage is that the value of β by it-
self may tell us little about how well the market is integrated. The point is
that even in an advanced market economy, both the market for distribu-
tion services and the labor market can not be fully integrated, hence, it is
not improbable that a relationship between the retail price differential
and income differential exists in such economies. If so, β should be re-
lated to a certain reference point βmin, which is the magnitude of β for an
economy thought of as being integrated. The value βmin represents the
(practicable) lower boundary of integration imperfection (bearing in mind
the widened notion of market integration).
The second way is to explicitly take into account differences in distribu-
tion costs or to eliminate them. In the former case, the right-hand side of
(4) should be supplemented with variables representing trading costs (or
their key components, e.g., local shipping tariffs, prices for electricity,
rents, and — primarily — wages in retail trade3) or the retail-wholesale
margin. In the latter case, prices on the left-hand side should be cleared
                                               
3 However, just inserting the wage variable leads to difficulties since wages could
be (and actually are) highly correlated with incomes, thus causing the multi-
collinearity problem.
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from distribution costs, i.e., price Pr is replaced by
rP ′  = Pr(1 – cr), (5)
where cr is the percent contribution of distribution costs to retail sales in
region r in a given year. Another method would be to use wholesale
prices, but data on these prices are hardly available, as the Russian sta
tistical agency does not collect data on the wholesale prices of con-
sumer goods intended for retail trade in various locations. And so, retail
prices cleared from the wholesale-retail margin are to be used as a
proxy of wholesale prices, that is,
rP′′  = Pr(1 – mr), (6)
mr being the retail-wholesale margin rated on a percentage basis to re-
tail sales in region r in a given year.
The disadvantage of this way is that available data on the costs and the
margins are aggregated over the entire retail trade sector; hence, these
data are but a rough index of the distribution costs in the price of a spe-
cific goods basket or, all the more, an individual good. So, transforma-
tion (6) can be very arbitrarily deemed as being a conversion of a retail
price into the "wholesale" one. Of course, this is not an actual wholesale
price, since the margin varies across goods, while mr is averaged over
all goods sold for a year.
3. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY AND DATA
3.1. Econometrics
The basic specification of the model being used for the analysis is
Prsit = βitIrst + (αit + γitLrs)Srsit + εrsit     (r,s) ∈ Π ⊂ {1, ..., N}2, (7)
for each unequal r and s from {1, ..., N}, the set Π contains exactly one
of the pairs (r, s) and (s, r). The following designations are used: r (as
well as s) indexes regions; N is the number of regions; Prsit = ln(Prit/Psit)
is the price differential, Prit is the price of good/basket of
goods/composite good i in region r at time t; Irst = ln(Irt/Ist) is the in-
come differential, Irt is the per capita income in region r at time t;
Lrs = lnDrs, Drs is the distance between the capital cities of regions r
and s; Srsit = sgn(Prsit) if Prsit ≠ 0, and Srsit = 1 if Prsit = 0; εrsit is the er-
ror term. Coefficient βit, which is to be estimated, measures the strength
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of linkage between the price differential and income differential at time t
in submarket i (market of the good i). It is expected to be positive or
zero (statistically insignificant) if the market is integrated. The sign of the
coefficient on distance, γit, is expected to be positive.
The fact that Srsit is a function of the exogenous variable may lead one to
suspect endogeneity in (7). However, this is not the case here. Informa-
tion inherent in an observation for a region pair (r, s) is identical with
that in an observation for the pair (s, r). Therefore each of the possible
2N(N – 1)/2 sets Π (which vary only in the order of regions in pairs) con-
tains the same information. Hence, estimates of (7) must be invariant
with the choice of Π. Let us take a sample {yi, Xi}, over which a linear
regression is estimated. It is known that multiplying both sides of the re-
gression by –1 for any observation k leaves the estimates and statistical
inference unaffected. Replacement of a pair (r, s) by (s, r) in Π is
equivalent to such an operation as Prsit ≡ –Psrit by construction. The sign
of Irst (as well as the signs of other variables augmenting the model; see
Sections 4 and 5) also changes automatically with the interchange of r
and s; however the intercept and Lrs (as Lrs ≡ Lsr) have to be explicitly
multiplied by –1. But, since all the sets Π are formally peer entities, extra
considerations are needed to answer the question of what sign of the
intercept and Lrs should correspond to the pair (r, s), and what to the
pair (r, s) (in distinction to the hypothetic regression where we have the
starting sample with the given signs of regressors). Economic intuition
provides these considerations, suggesting that the rise in distance be-
tween r and s will cause the absolute value of the price differential, |Prsit|,
to increase. That is, positive Prsit must increase by Lrs, and negative Prsit
must decrease by Lrs, i.e., increase by –Lrs. On this ground, the set
Π+ = {(r, s)|Prsit ≥ 0} is taken as the "starting" one, Lrs having its "inher-
ent" sign (Lrs = lnDrs) and the intercept is taken to be +1 in relevant ob-
servations. The signs of these regressors alternate when the order of re-
gions in the pair turns out to be reverse as compared with the pair
belonging to Π+. For an arbitrary Π, this is formalized by representing the
intercept as 1×Srsit, and the distance variable as  Lrs×Srsit, where Srsit = 1
if (r, s) ∈ Π∩Π+ and Srsit = –1 if (r, s) ∈ Π\Π+. Thus, Srsit is not, in fact,
a function of the dependent variable. Its definition above (as
Srsit = sgn(Prsit) and so on) is merely a convenient practical representa-
tion which demonstrates how the values of Srsit are calculated.
While estimates of (7) are invariant with Π, variable means and other sta-
tistics involving these means (such as the standard deviations of vari-
ables and the R2 statistic) do depend on the choice of Π. To avoid this,
the Π-dependent statistics reported below (in Table 1 and elsewhere)
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are calculated with a zero mean (or equivalently, over the set of all pairs,
{(r, s)|r ≠ s}).
Regressions are run separately for each i and each t. Thus, the se-
quence of estimates {βit}t=1, ..., T provides an evolving pattern of market
integration during the time span 1, ..., T (by submarket i). Besides that,
in most instances panel estimations are run, thus providing an estimate,
aggregated over the entire span, of the impact of one or other factor on
market integration. Since distances are not time-dependent, the random
effects model is implemented. To identify factors hindering market inte-
gration, additional variables are entered into Equation (7).
All estimations are run over three samples of regions:
(1) entire Russia;
(2) Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions, where prices are high
due to expensive shipping but incomes are also high owing to the
so-called "northern increments" to wages (and so this could yield
spurious dependence of prices on incomes);
(3) the European part of Russia excluding its northern territories (for
brevity, hereafter referred to as simply European Russia), which has
relatively favorable conditions for arbitrage within this group of re-
gions (i.e., due to the absence of such impediments like long dis-
tances, poor communications, etc.).
3.2. Data
Capital cities of regions are used as representatives of regions. Since
reasonably complete data are lacking for a number of Russian regions,
74 regions (of all the 89 constituting the Russian Federation) are covered
with the basic sample being used. The omitted regions are as follows: all
the 10 autonomous okrugs, Chechen Republic, Republic of Ingushetia,
the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, the Moscow Oblast, and the Leningrad
Oblast (the last two are omitted because their capital cities, Moscow and
Saint Petersburg, are at the same time separate subjects of the Russian
Federation reckoned among the 89 regions). To obtain the sample rep-
resenting Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions, the Murmansk
Oblast, Sakha (Yakut) Republic, the Kamchatka Oblast, the Magadan
Oblast, and the Sakhalin Oblast are removed from the basic sample. The
sample called European Russia covers all regions belonging to the Euro-
pean part of the country except for Komi Republic, the Arkhangelsk
Oblast, the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and the Murmansk Oblast.
Hence, there are 2701 (= 74 × 73/2) region pairs across entire Russia,
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2346 pairs excluding difficult-to-access regions, and 1275 pairs across
European Russia.
Distances are mostly railroad distances. These are drawn from the Tariff
Manual (1965) and updated (as well as supplemented with highway, sea
and river distances for regions having no railway communication) with
the use of modern geographical atlases.
Three kinds of price data are used. The first is the cost of the basket of
basic food goods accepted as standard by Goskomstat. The basket is
not uniform during the years of transition. Throughout 1992 – 1996, it in-
cludes 19 goods; beginning in December 1993, the cost of the 25-item
basket is contemporaneously provided, having replaced the former since
January 1997. The composition and the structure of both baskets are
reported in Appendix B. The periods involved are every December from
1992 through 1999; regions are represented by their capital cities. The
basic income data include monthly per capita incomes during the rele-
vant periods. The sources of the price and income data are Goskomstat
(1996), pp. 139 – 141, Goskomstat (1998a), pp. 97 – 99, and Goskom-
stat (1999a), pp. 397 – 399, 405 – 406; data for 1999 are obtained from
the Goskomstat database;4 costs of the 25-item basket for 1992 are
obtained directly from Goskomstat of Russia.
The second kind of the data is spatial (inter-regional) consumer price in-
dices calculated by Surinov (1999) for January 1997 and 1998. The indi-
ces cover the same wide set of commodities as the official temporal CPI
(but, unlike the latter, the weight system implemented for the aggrega-
tion is uniform across regions and for both periods). Two components of
the overall spatial index are analyzed here, namely, the food price index
and the industrial goods price index that involve 74 and 144 goods cor-
respondingly as judged by Goskomstat (1998b).
The third kind of data is prices for a number of individual goods. These
data are dissimilar in terms of both sets of goods in various years
and the form of the data. Prices drawn from Goskomstat (1996a),
pp. 90 – 104 are provided for each December between 1992 – 1995
across regional capital cities; 10 food goods are covered. Besides that,
prices have been calculated from the purchasing power of monthly in-
comes reported by Goskomstat (1998c), pp. 99 – 101, 252 – 257; Go-
skomstat (1999b), pp. 101 – 103, 253 – 258; and Goskomstat (2000b),
pp. 116 – 118, 294 – 299. These data are averaged over the relevant
year; the commodity sets contain 8 food goods and 6 industrial goods
                                               
4 It not reported whether the observations for 1998 and 1999 refer to regional
capital cities; most probably, the data are aggregated over each region.
COMMON RUSSIAN MARKET: MYTH RATHER THAN REALITY22
for 1997, and 12 food goods and 6 industrial goods (of the latter, only 3
are the same as in 1997) for 1998 and 1999. Unfortunately, data on
prices of individual goods for 1996 were not found.
Trading costs in large and medium shops relative to retail sales are used
as an indicator of retail distribution costs, and net revenue (calculated as
the difference of sale proceeds and purchase value of goods) in large
and medium shops is used as an indicator of the wholesale-retail margin.
The sources of the data are Goskomstat (1996b), pp. 38 – 43, and
Goskomstat (1998d), pp. 160 – 161, 164 – 165. These data span
1993 – 1997 (although Goskomstat (1999d) provides data for 1998, they
are reported there in monetary terms only; data on sales of large and
medium shops is lacking). To fill the gap of 1998 – 1999, the values for
1997 are extended to these years.
3.3. Robustness Checks
Incomes. Since December per capita incomes are used as the measure
of incomes, there may be some doubts as to the validity of the results.
First, December incomes could suffer from fluctuations caused by, e.g.,
Christmas bonuses, etc. Second, modern Russian statistical data on in-
comes are rather unreliable. Therefore, three other indicators of incomes
were tried: per capita income averaged over the year, surveyed per cap-
ita household pecuniary income, and wages. All three had a minor im-
pact on the quantitative results, and did not affect the qualitative pattern
at all. Moreover, these measures turn out to be closely (sometimes, al-
most functionally) linked to one another as well as to the indicator used.
Thus it is felt that although the absolute levels of incomes are not reli-
able, their inter-regional ratios are not far from truth.
Spatial correlation. It is not inconceivable that prices in neighboring
regions are related to each other. In this case, prices would be spatially
correlated; hence, standard errors of estimates in (7) would turn out to
be inconsistent. Spatial econometrics provides tools to handle spatial
correlation; see Anselin (1988, 1999). However, using region pairs, these
tools do not directly apply, since the region pair by itself is not a location
object which spatial econometrics deals with (e.g., it is vague what is the
distance between a region pair, and what are neighboring pairs).
To overcome this impediment, the following approach was implemented.
Equation (7) may be thought of as being the difference of two equations
(to economize notations, the indices i and t are omitted)
lnPl = α′ + βlnIl + νl (8)
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with l = r and l = s, being augmented with the term (α + γLrs)Srs. Then
εrs = (νr – νs) + µrs, (9)
where µrs is an additional residual component being induced by inserting
the distance term. It is reasonable to suppose that νr and νs are not
correlated with µrs, but they may be correlated with one another (the
correlation just reflecting the presence of spatial correlation). Also, µrs
are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other. Then elements of the
covariance matrix for (7), Ω = (ω(rs)(pq)), take the form:
ω(rs)(pq) = Cov(εrs, εpq) = Cov(νr, νp) – Cov(νr, νq) – Cov(νs, νp) +
     + Cov(νs, νq) = οrp – οrq – οsp + οsq       (r, s) ≠ (p, q), (10a)
(ω(rs)(rs)) = σ2(µrs) + σ2(νr) + σ2(νs) – 2Cov(νr, νs) = 
     = σ2(µrs) + οrr + οss – 2οrs, (10b)
where Ο = (οrs) is the covariance matrix of residuals in (8). Thus, under
the stated assumptions, the off-diagonal term of the covariance matrix
for the region pair model can be expressed in terms of the covariance
matrix for the model dealing directly with location objects, namely, single
regions.
The matrix Ο was estimated with the use of nonlinear regression:
ν ν = κ + ρ λ + ξ! ! exp( )r s rs rsL ; (11)
the expected signs of the estimates are as follows: κ < 0, ρ > 0, λ < 0.
With this, two versions of 
!
Ο were constructed, the homoscedastic one,
in which Ο = κ + ρ λ
!! ! !
exp( )rs rsL  for each r, s (thus, Ο = κ + ρ
! ! !
rr  in it), and
the heteroscedastic one, in which diagonal terms were estimated as
Ο = ν
! !2
rr r . The matrix 
!
Ω  was constructed of elements of 
!
Ο according to
(10a); e.g., with homoscedastic 
!
Ο,
( )( ) [exp( ) exp( ) exp( ) exp( )]rs pq rp rq sp sqL L L Lω ρ λ λ λ λ= − − +
! ! ! !!!
 (r, s) ≠ (p, q); (12)
estimates of the diagonal terms of 
!
Ω  were 2))(( rsrsrs ε=ω
!!
.
To take advantage of the service of standard econometric packages,
the GLS was implemented as follows. Let P = Xc + ε be the matrix
representation of (7). The transformation P* = Ω–1/2P, X* = Ω–1/2X,
ε* = Ω–1/2ε provides a model P* = X*c + ε*, which when estimated with
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the OLS, yields, as is easy to see, the same results as the GLS does,
! !*
GLS=c c .
In all instances, the coefficient standard errors corrected for spatial
correlation turn out to be almost the same as the White heteroscedastic-
consistent errors. The coefficient estimates themselves almost do not
change at all, too. However, spatial correlation is present, generally, in
the generating model (8). From this it may be concluded that the
distance variable in the "pairwise" model (7) captures the interactions
between regions, so eliminating the spatial correlation (hence, existence
of the latter in model (8) is probably caused by a missing interaction
variable).
Only cross-sections were tested for spatial correlation. Attempts to per-
form this with panels — in particular, using methods implemented by
Baltagi and Li (1999) — failed because of the cumbersome matrix Ω
having the size of 1275×1275 to 2701×2701 for each cross-section. Nev-
ertheless, deducing from the results obtained for cross-sections, it is be-
lieved that spatial correlation is not present in the panels as well.
4. PATTERN OF RUSSIA'S MARKET INTEGRATION
4.1. Relationship between Price and Demand Differences
Food baskets. Table 1 tabulates standard deviations of the price differ-
ential, σit(Prsit), for costs of the 19- and 25-food baskets (for brevity,
hereafter referred to as "price-19" and "price-25") as well as those of
income differential, σt(Irst). As would be expected, the volatility of basket
costs turns out to be far less — decreased by 14 to 38% — when diffi-
cult-to-access regions are omitted from consideration. As one excludes
Asian and northern regions from the remainder of the country, so
obtaining European Russia, the basket cost volatility drops significantly
further. However, the decrease is predominantly smaller than in the
first case.
The temporal behavior of price variability in Table 1 supports the finding
of the papers cited in the introduction that price dispersion across Rus-
sian locations tends to fall with time. The volatility of the basket prices
increases towards the end of 1993, and permanently diminishes after-
wards (in European Russia, the decrease begins in 1993). By December
of 1999, it falls 1.8-fold against the maximum, and 2.2-fold if difficult-to-
access regions are not taken into account. In contrast with this, the in-
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come volatility rises towards the end of 1995, stabilizes in 1996, and only
then begins to fall. But, by the end of 1998, it increases again (evidently,
as a consequence of the the August 1998 financial crisis). The general
pattern of price volatility does not change if the standard deviations are
calculated over regional subsamples, i.e., excluding difficult-to-access
regions or excluding Asian and northern regions. The exception is 1998;
while price volatility decreases across the entire Russia as compared
with the previous period, it remains unchanged if the difficult-to-access
regions are eliminated, and the volatility rises across European Russia's
regions. Thus, the crisis of 1998 has acted in an opposing manner on
different parts of the country; it has increased price volatility in European
Russia and has diminished it in the northern regions, Siberia and the Far-
Eastern regions.
The results on the impact of inter-regional demand differences and dis-
tance on inter-regional differences in costs of the food baskets are
summarized in Table 2. Throughout this paper, standard errors are in
parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels. Except for Table 6, standard errors being reported are the White
heteroscedasticity-consistent errors for cross-sectional regressions, and
the panel heteroscedasticity-corrected errors for panel regressions.
The results indicate a strong positive relationship between prices and in-
comes during the whole time span considered. All estimates of β are









Price-19 Price-25 Income Price-19 Price-25 Income Price-19 Price-25 Income
1992:12* 0.308 0.333 0.466 0.264 0.285 0.386 0.257 0.281 0.296
1993:12 0.404 0.392 0.492 0.325 0.325 0.405 0.211 0.245 0.339
1994:12 0.374 0.349 0.531 0.272 0.256 0.472 0.195 0.201 0.394
1995:12 0.338 0.327 0.581 0.247 0.233 0.515 0.191 0.173 0.491
1996:12 0.330 0.314 0.571 0.211 0.208 0.507 0.129 0.125 0.486
1997:12 — 0.289 0.546 — 0.178 0.456 — 0.116 0.417
1998:12 — 0.238 0.593 — 0.180 0.510 — 0.150 0.507
1999:12 — 0.222 0.585 — 0.147 0.523 — 0.120 0.512
* 2415 observations for all regions, 2145 observations for Russia excluding difficult-to-access
regions, 1128 observations for European Russia.
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statistically significant (at the level of better than 0.1%) and have the ex-
pected positive sign. However, except for two cases, the sensitivity of
the price differential variation to change in the income differential is
higher than to the change in distance; not infrequently, the difference is
as much as several times.
Considering the sample of all regions, the estimates of the coefficient on
income range from 0.126 to 0.249 over the years. Since β represents the
elasticity of price to income, this implies that a 1-percent change in per
capita income yields a 0.13 to 0.25 percent change in the food basket
cost in the same direction. The panel estimates corroborate a strong
price-income relationship over the whole set of cross-sections. The co-
efficient on distance is highly significant too in all estimations, but its val-
ues ranging from 0.039 to 0.147 are, as a rule, sufficiently smaller than
those of the income coefficient. The panel estimates suggest the differ-
ence between these coefficients to be 1.6 – 1.7-fold.
Excluding difficult-to-access regions, all values of β dramatically de-
crease — 1.4 to 2.6-fold (γ goes down, too, as it must). Nevertheless,
this affects neither the statistical significance of the estimates nor — ex-
cept for the only case — the qualitative pattern of the coefficient behav-
ior in time. Hence it follows that the regions with difficult access play an
important role in explaining the dependence of prices on incomes across
the whole country; however, they only account for a certain share of the
dependence, since the price-income relationship still remains strong
across the remaining regions.
When the Asian and European northern territories are removed, the sta-
tistical significance of the estimates of β remains intact, too. As com-
pared with the previous subsample, their values do not always decrease.
A marked decrease is seen only for 1993; in a number of cases, β rises
in European Russia relative the whole country excluding difficult-to-
access regions. Besides that, both decreases and increases in β are for
the most part not substantial. Hence it may be concluded that European
Russia cannot be thought of as much, if at all, more integrated than the
remainder of the country excluding regions with difficult access. This is
surprising evidence: seemingly, one might expect European regions to
move faster towards integration than the rest of Russia, where regions
are mostly far apart. As for distance, when the Asian and North-
European regions of the country are eliminated, values of γ fall dramati-
cally, turning out to be statistically insignificant in a few years.
However, the question of to what extent the results reported relate to
integration of product market proper, and to what extent to that of adja-
cent markets (market for distribution services and labor market) remains
open. In other words, this is a question as to how robust these results
are to the inter-regional differences in the non-tradable component of
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goods. The answer is presented in Table 3, which provides the estima-
tion results for model (7) augmented with the distribution costs variable
ln(crt/cst). Lacking data for 1992, this year is omitted; since that year
features high instability of economic indicators, it would be illegitimate to
extend the values of nearby years to 1992 as is done for 1998 – 1999.
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DC — distribution costs of retail trade.
In most instances, distribution costs are highly significant and have the
expected positive sign (except in two cases for European Russia in
1995). However, a comparison of Tables 2 and 3 suggests that the addi-
tion of this variable has no essential influence on the other estimates;
these change only slightly. Besides that, although a decrease in the de-
pendence between prices and incomes prevails, an increase occurs in a
number of instances. Hence the apprehension that the income variable
considerably incorporates the effect of distribution costs is not corrobo-
rated.
To verify this, one more way of taking into account distribution costs was
tried: "cleaning" prices from these costs, according to (5). The relevant
results are tabulated in Table 4.
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With this method of accounting for distribution costs, the dependence of
prices on incomes distinctly weakens. But its statistical significance still
remains high in all cases. The qualitative pattern of the temporal price
behavior remains essentially the same as well. Along with this, one as-
pect, which is slightly perceptible in Tables 2 and 3, turns out to be very
pronounced. Figures from Table 4 provide evidence that after 1993 the
market of European Russia becomes more segmented than that of the
entire country excluding difficult-to-access regions, and beginning in
1996, than that of the entire country even including these regions. Such
a result is attributable to the fact that the "northern increments" to
wages in the northern and eastern territories raise distribution costs, and
this obscures to some extent the actual difference in market integration
between European Russia and the rest of the country; controlling for
this, the difference becomes evident. Hence it follows that the relation-
ship between prices and incomes does partially incorporate the influence
of distribution services.
As an alternative measure, the retail-wholesale margin, mrt, was imple-
mented. It is incorporated in the model in the same manner as was crt,
i.e., as the additional variable or for price "clearance." The estimation
results are reported in Appendix C. The figures are closely similar
to these obtained with the distribution costs indicator, as it is seen
from comparison of Table 3 with C1 and Table 4 with C2. This is of
no surprise since the indicators are closely correlated with one another.
The coefficient of correlation between crt and mrt over 1993 – 1999 is
equal to 0.82 (ranging by year from 0.73 to 0.95); the correlation be-
tween (1 – crt) and (1 – mrt) is 0.63 (from 0.51 to 0.93 by year).
Thus, the difference in distribution costs is responsible for some share of
the price dispersion, and so, in the absence of a relevant variable in the
regression, its role is picked up by the income variable. However, using
distribution costs yields no fundamental changes in inference. And so, it
is possible to dispense with taking into account the distribution costs (at
least, while analyzing the Russian market). Some details of the qualitative
pattern of price behavior may be lost, but it will essentially be similar.
The findings reported can be interpreted as bearing witness to poor
market integration in Russia even at present. Since the relationship be-
tween prices and incomes remains to be significant and rather strong
even though distances and distribution costs as well as territories with
difficult access are controlled for, this implies that there are more seri-
ous barriers to trade between the regions than distances.
The evolving pattern of integration is largely the same, be it obtained
over all regions or their subsamples. The fragmentation of the market in-
creases until the period 1994:12 and then permanently falls (up to half
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and more in the terms of β) with the exceptions of 1997 and 1999. On
the whole, it can be argued that beginning in about 1994 – 1995, the
general tendency is an improvement in Russian internal market integra-
tion. The far from obvious result is that despite the increase of price
volatility by the end of 1998 in European Russia due to the August crisis,
the degree of fragmentation, on the contrary, has fallen here. The de-
cline in integration in 1997 seems quite puzzling as, according to aggre-
gate measures such as inflation, GNP growth, and foreign direct invest-
ment, this year was the most successful as compared with all preceding
years. The degree of market fragmentation rose (though less) in 1999 as
well. The reasons are obscure, too; most probably, this is a conse-
quence of the 1998 crisis.
To quantitatively estimate the speed and direction of changes in the in-
tegration of the Russian market, the adopted integration measure for the
25-food basket is represented as β = β0 + β1t (where t is a year of the
considered time span; t = 0 for the initial year) and is estimated over a
panel. The basic model as well as the models with two ways of the in-
corporating both distribution costs indicators are implemented. For esti-
mates of the basic model to be comparable with other versions, its esti-
mations are performed over the panel of 1993 – 1999, in addition to the
estimation over the entire span of 1992 – 1999. Table 5 summarizes the
estimates obtained.
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Except for two, all estimates in Table 5 are statistically significant at the
1% level. These two are estimates of the trend factor β1 in European
Russia that are provided by both models with "cleared" prices. In all in-
stances the sign of the trend factor is negative, so suggesting that the
prevailing tendency is, indeed, a decrease in market fragmentation, that
is, an improvement in integration. As for the insignificant estimates, the
significance level of the first one is 10.2%, and the estimate becomes
significant over the panel of 1994 – 1999, having the same negative
sign; the second turns out to be significant (and negative) over the panel
of 1995 – 1999. Both the basic model and the models with the distribu-
tion costs variable provide coinciding results. However, clearing prices of
the distribution costs, the rate of the decrease of market fragmentation
falls markedly. Nevertheless, all the estimate versions are qualitatively
similar. They indicate that eliminating difficult-to-access regions, the im-
provement in integration becomes slower; deceleration is more dramatic
for European Russia.
To conclude this part of the analysis, let us consider some estimates re-
lating to spatial correlation. To save room, these are reported only for
the 25-food basket and for the heteroscedastic version of 
!
Ο . Table 6
presents values of ρ and λ obtained with regression (11) that are used
for constructing the terms of the covariance matrix 
!
Ω , see (12).
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All estimates, except the sole estimate that is insignificant, have
"correct" signs, i.e., ρ is positive and λ is negative. One third of the
estimates of the generating matrix Ο are insignificant, preventing
Ω from being constructed in such cases. (What is the distinctive fea-
ture is the insignificance of the estimates for 1998 over all three re-
gion samples. This can be explained as follows. During the inflation
shock provoked by the August crisis, prices in nearby regions simply
had no time to influence each other). However, spatial correlation in
generating model (8) takes place in two thirds of the instances. Curi-
ously, λ is one order of magnitude more in European Russia (with
its relatively short distances between regions) than in the remainder
of the country. This means that here the impact of regional prices on
each other weakens much faster with distance. In general, given the
long distances between Russian regions and the specific values of λ,
the majority of exponents exp(λLrs) differ little from zero. Taking into
account as well the fact that ))(( rsrsω
!
 is constructed, by (12), of their
differences, it becomes clear that matrix Ω will be almost diagonal,
and the standard error of parameters in (7) will be little affected as
against the heteroscedasticity-consistent errors.
Spatial price indices. Table 7 reports results concerning the inter-
regional consumer price indices. Covering three times as many
goods, the food price index has smaller volatility across regions than
the price-25 (since periods do not coincide for these two indicators,
adjacent periods are matched for comparisons, that is, 1996:12 and
1997:1, 1997:12 and 1998:1).
Table 7. Summary Statistics and Estimation Results for the Spatial Price Indices.
Foods Industrial goods
Sample/Version/Variable
1997:1 1998:1 1997:1 1998:1
Standard deviations of index differentials
All regions (2701 obs.) 0.249 0.228 0.214 0.207
Excluding difficult-to-access
regions (2346 obs.)
0.155 0.138 0.162 0.161
European Russia (1275 obs.) 0.081 0.078 0.152 0.147
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Continued from p. 34
Foods Industrial goods
Sample/Version/Variable
1997:1 1998:1 1997:1 1998:1
Coefficient estimates
Basic model:























































the distribution costs variable:
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Continued from p. 35
Foods Industrial goods
Sample/Version/Variable
1997:1 1998:1 1997:1 1998:1
Index cleared
from distribution costs:
















































The behavior of the index and the price-25 is the same. As with the
price-25, the standard deviations decrease if one eliminates difficult-to-
access regions and then Asian and northern regions from the sample.
Again, the degree of fragmentation dramatically falls when the difficult-
to-access regions are separated, but the decrease is unnoticeable if the
case in hand is European Russia; using the index cleared from distribu-
tion costs, it becomes evident that market integration in European Russia
is poorer as compared with the remainder of the country. At last, the
fragmentation increases in going from 1997:1 to 1998:1 as with going
from 1996:12 to 1997:12 in the case of the price-25. Moreover, match-
ing values of estimates (including those obtained by taking into account
the distribution costs) are very close to each other. Thus, it can be
stated that the basket of 25 foods is a good representative of foodstuffs
as a whole (at least, of these covered by Goskomstat's CPI).
The volatility of the industrial goods price index, calculated over all re-
gions, is smaller than that of foods. But the former becomes similar to
the latter if difficult-to-access regions are excluded; in European Russia,
the standard deviation of the industrial goods index differential is almost
twice as much as that of the food index differential. Nevertheless, esti-
mates of β are smaller for the industrial good price index than for the
food price index in all cases. The fragmentation of the market rises,
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The dependence of prices for industrial goods on distance, i.e., trans-
portation costs, over the entire country is weaker than for that of foods,
but it is stronger when the case in hand is European Russia. As a conse-
quence, the impact of this factor turns out to be the same both over the
entire country excluding difficult-to-access regions and over European
Russia.
The lower values of β indicate that the industrial goods market is more
integrated than the food market. On the one hand, this seems rather
likely, since regional protectionism, price regulations and so on deal al-
most only with foodstuffs. But, on the other hand, such a result is not in
agreement with the previous one obtained by Gluschenko (2001a)
through the cointegration analysis of the temporal food and industrial
goods price indices over Western Siberia. A possible reason of the dis-
crepancy may be the specificity of the Western-Siberian market or bi-
ases in regional CPIs (see Gluschenko, 2001b).
The consequences of taking into account distribution services are the
same as with the food baskets. That is, the insertion of the relevant
additional variable only slightly affects the dependence of price on in-
come, and the "cleaning" from distribution costs slackens it, but not
fundamentally. The same holds both for the distribution costs indicator
and the retail-wholesale margin (results with the latter are reported in
Appendix D). However, estimates yielded with the use of one or another
diverge more than in the case of the food baskets. Probably, the point is
that values of the "wholesale" price indices are nearer to true values
than the "wholesale" cost of the basket of 19 or 25 foods, owing to the
akin aggregation structure of the price index and the retail-wholesale
margin proxy. In this case, the distinction between the distribution costs
and the retail-wholesale margin comes into importance in spite of their
high mutual correlation.
Individual goods. To save room, regressions without distribution costs
are reported here. Taking into account these costs, the effects are the
same as above. That is, changes of β are minor with distribution costs as
an additional variable, and cleaning of prices from costs lowers β; the
qualitative patterns remaining unaltered. Estimations of the impact of
distribution costs can be found in the electronic version of the paper.
In Table 8 the panel data results on the impact of inter-regional demand
differences and distance on differences in prices of individual foods
are set out. These are goods that are involved in both the 19-item and
25-item basket (excluding vodka) and cover about a half of each basket
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(see Appendix B). Whereas data for 1992 – 1995 are provided for each
December, and indicators published for 1997 – 1999 are year averages,
the two separate panels are isolated (recall that there are no data for
1996). Cross-sectional estimates corresponding to the panel ones in Ta-
ble 8 are presented in the electronic version. All except a few statistically
significant estimates have expected positive signs.
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a 1998 – 1999 in columns "1997 – 1999".
As with the basket costs and price indices, elimination of difficult-to-
access regions dramatically reduces, as a rule, the dependence of
prices on incomes. However, there is no fundamental distinction between
the remainder of the country and European Russia; rather submarkets of
corresponding goods are less integrated in European Russia (unreported
estimates with prices cleared of distribution costs corroborate this).
The results in Table 8 suggest that market integration tends to improve
in going from the time span of 1992 – 1995 to the span of 1997 – 1999
as values of β fall, although not always. from estimates by year, it follows
that market fragmentation does increase in 1997 as compared with 1995
in a number of cases. However, the fragmentation decreases from 1997
to 1998, sometimes increasing again in 1999. From the cross-sectional
estimates as well, it can be seen that most goods provide similar evolv-
ing patterns of market integration. The pattern is that fragmentation rises
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during 1992 – 1994, and then integration begins to improve with some
deviations in 1997 and 1999.
By and large, prices of individual food goods behave in line with the be-
havior of aggregated price measures, that is, the costs of the food bas-
kets and the spatial food price index. At the same time, estimates suffi-
ciently vary across goods. It would take too much space to consider all
these differences; therefore, let us limit ourselves to a portion of them.
For the most part, the maximum values of β across goods are for bread
and milk. The explanation seems to be that the price for bread is most
often subject to regulations, prices for bread being most intensively both
directly regulated and subsidized just in poor regions, thus strengthening
the dependence of these prices on incomes. As for milk, it is a perish-
able good, a minor share of which could be arbitraged (between neigh-
boring regions). And so, one should expect a strong dependence of
price on local demand.
The dependence of the dispersion of prices for milk on income disper-
sion is less in 1992 – 1995 than in 1997 – 1999. The opposite pattern is
seen for butter, that is, the dependence is weak in 1992 – 1995, and it
sharply strengthens in 1997 – 1999. Besides that, the relationship be-
tween the price for butter and income is much weaker in 1992 – 1995
than that of other goods. A possible reason is as follows. In the early
years of market transformation, producers ran into great difficulties sell-
ing raw milk. To overcome these difficulties, they started processing milk
into far less perishable products, butter and cheese, to an increasing
extent. It seems likely that the resulting overproduction of butter neces-
sitated maximizing the area of deliveries, and this sufficiently enhanced
inter-regional competition. But at the same time, the production of milk
was being cut down; thereafter, the overproduction of milk and dairy
products was eliminated, and so, the dependence of the butter price
differential on the income differential rose.
Eggs are perishables as well. Therefore, prices for them, like for milk,
would seem to depend strongly on local demand. However, this depend-
ence is rather weak (if difficult-to-access regions, where eggs are almost
not produced at all, are not taken into account). In all likelihood, the rea-
son is high elasticity of the demand for eggs, as opposed to the low-
elastic demand for milk, which limits the possibilities of a rise in prices
for eggs.
The dependence of the dispersion of prices for frozen fish on income
dispersion features a sequential increase when excluding the difficult-to-
access regions and then the remaining northern and Asian regions. The
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point is that it is just the remote regions of the Far East, the difficult-to-
access ones among them (e.g., Kamchatka), that deliver frozen fish. In
these regions, the price of frozen fish is much lower than in the Euro-
pean part of the country. Going from one regional sample to other is
equivalent, in fact, to eliminating a portion of the fish-producing regions
at first, and subsequently almost all of them.
For vodka, the abnormal (negative) dependence of price on income in
1992 is obtained. This may have a rational explanation. Traffic in vodka
was extremely profitable during these years, and so, there were lots of
mediators who took part in such activity. To maximize their gain, they
were rushing primarily to rich regions, and thus were beating the prices
down there. Afterwards, small mediators were ousted from; the explicit
or latent protectionist policy of regional authorities regarding the trade in
alcohol added to this.
Among the cross-sectional estimates of β, there is only one estimate
that almost equals 1, that is, for sausage in 1992. The point is that sau-
sage was something like a fetish in the late years of the Soviet era, the
years of permanent shortage. Such special attitude toward this good re-
sulted in high elasticity of price to local demand (measured by income
per capita) in the first year of price liberalization.
The results concerning prices of individual industrial goods are tabulated
in Table 9; details are given in the electronic version. Data on these
prices are even more sketchy than the data on food prices and are avail-
able only for three years. For three goods (children's jackets, children's
boots, and cigarettes) the estimates reported in Table 9 are cross-
sectional, covering only 1997.
For all but one β and one γ, the panel estimates are positive, as ex-
pected. Of 54 estimates by year, 3 distance estimates and 5 income es-
timates are negative. Besides for statistical reasons, the negative rela-
tionships could be caused by the poor accuracy of raw data for 1997
(that is the only year where statistically significant negative values of β
occur). Purchasing powers of incomes per capita are reported for 1997
as integers in Goskomstat (1988c). Given the expensiveness of clothes
and footgear relative to monthly incomes per capita in many regions, the
results are low precision of prices for such goods, which are calculated
from purchasing power.
A more detailed pattern of the industrial goods market corroborates the
above-stated conclusion drawn from the analysis of the spatial industrial
good price index, that is, that this market is poorly integrated (however,
this should be take with reservations as the goods in question comprise
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Table 9. Impact of Income and Distance on Prices of Individual Industrial Goods.
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only 6% of the set covered by the index). There are no indications of
better integration in European Russia.
4.2. Summary and Discussion
In general, the findings reported allow us to conclude that the spatial
behavior of consumer prices in Russia is inconsistent with the concept of
how they should behave in an integrated market economy. However, the
Russian market has features inherent in actual market economies.
First of all, distances matter, having a pronounced effect on price dis-
persion from the very beginning of transition. Berkowitz and DeJong
(1999) obtained different results; they found no dependence of price
dispersion on distance unless Russian regions were divided into two
clusters, the "Red Belt" and the rest Russia. A possible reason may be
that in their study price dispersion was represented by values averaged
over 1992 – 1996. Since the pattern had been mixed during those years,
as sequences of the cross-sectional estimations reported above show,
this could hide the relationship between prices and distances. (It should
be noted that in a later study, which will be considered below, these
authors find the dependence of price dispersion on distance; moreover,
they use it to measure integration).
Although distances are responsible for price differences, they are not
fully responsible. There is a sufficient remainder that depends on inter-
regional income dispersion. The same still holds if distribution costs are
controlled for. Since income per capita is used as the proxy of relative
demand in the study, this remainder is a representative of the integral
effect of all barriers to arbitrage.
There is a "natural" impediment to market integration in Russia. That is,
a cluster of difficult-to-access regions contributing markedly to price
dispersion across the entire country. Due to this geographical feature,
the Russian internal market cannot become fully integrated during any
foreseeable time, be the Russian economy as advanced market econ-
omy as wished. Nevertheless, albeit weakening dependence of price
differences on income dispersion, controlling for this factor does not
eliminate the relationship. What is more, the market of European Russia
with its more favorable conditions for arbitrage turns out to be less inte-
grated than the market of Russia as a whole excluding difficult-to-access
regions.
As noted above, there is no reference point to judge the economic sig-
nificance of the relationships between prices and incomes as compared
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to values for advanced market economies. Therefore one is forced to
base judgements on the theoretical standard which suggests that there
should not be a relationship between price and local demand over and
above what is caused by transportation costs and the non-tradable com-
ponent of the good. (However, it is important to bear in mind that such a
comparison may be too severe for the Russian market, overstating its
shortcomings, since it is unlikely that actual economies thought of as
being integrated entirely match this speculative standard.) From this
viewpoint, obtained magnitudes of β are mostly too much high, thus indi-
cating poor integration among Russian regional markets.
Along with this, the general trend is improvement in integration in recent
years. The fact that the measure of market fragmentation is decreasing
with time testifies to (or, at least, provides a hope) that the Russian in-
ternal market is moving towards integration. In general, the evolving
pattern of integration is as follows. Market fragmentation rose in the
early years of transition, having peaked between 1994 and 1995. Then
fragmentation diminishes though not steadily, with deviations from the
tendency in 1997 and 1999.
It is interesting to compare this pattern with a pattern obtained with the
use of a quite different methodology. Berkowitz and DeJong (2001)
measure the extent of market integration in Russia as the percentage of
integrated regions. Region r is deemed to be integrated at time t if the
relationship between price dispersion and distances from this region to
others is statistically significant. Price dispersion is measured as a stan-
dard deviation σrs(t) = σ(ln(Prt/Pst)) calculated over a 12-month period
t – T, ..., t + T. Prices are represented by the cost of the basket of 25
food goods. The qualitative pattern obtained by these authors and the
pattern presented above have much in common though they do not co-
incide in full. Berkowitz and DeJong find integration to deteriorate during
1996, while the above-reported results indicate that it rises from the end
of 1995 to the end of 1996. However, both the studies provide evidence
of improvement in integration in 1994 – 1995 and 1998. Besides that,
the findings by Berkowitz and DeJong point to a dramatic fall in integra-
tion in 1997, like regressions reported in Section 4.1 do.
As mentioned in the introduction, there is one regression specification
used by Engel and Rogers (1996) that can be correlated, to some
extent, with the approach being used in this study. They explored
the impact of the border on price dispersion among cities of the
USA and Canada. In the equation being dealt with, the dependent
variable is price volatility, calculated as the standard deviation
Vrs(Prs) = σ(ln(Prt/Pst) – ln(Pr, t–2/Ps, t–2)) over a certain time span; the
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explanatory variables are distance, a border dummy, and the volatility of
real wages for manufacturing employees (which is calculated in the
same manner as price volatility). It is reasonable to assume that wages
are strongly correlated with personal incomes. Then the relevant variable
in the Engel – Rogers regression may be treated as an analogue of the
demand proxy in Equation (7).
Engel and Rogers obtained the wage dispersion coefficient to be positive
for 13 of all of their 14 goods, and to be significant for 10. Its value
equals 0.18 in the pooled regression covering all goods, while the dis-
tance coefficient is 0.000843. Hence, a 1-percent increase in wage
volatility yields the same contribution to the rise in price volatility like
the increase of distance by exp(2.135) = 8.5 times. For foodstuffs ("food
at home/food purchased from stores"), this value is equal to
exp(17.95) = 62.4 × 106; the coefficients respectively equaling 0.28 and
0.000156. The USA-Canada border contributes less, too, than wage dis-
persion, the coefficient on the border dummy being equal to 0.0114 for
all goods, and 0.00674 for foodstuffs.
The authors assign the entire effect of wage dispersion to the difference
in non-tradable marketing services (segmentation of labor markets).
However, the importance of the effect casts some doubts, in light of the
above presented results (see, e.g., Table 3), on such an interpretation.
Most probably, the wage-dispersion variable captures, along with the
impact of the difference in marketing costs, a dependence of prices on
local demands, which is caused by the imperfect integration of the
goods market. An additional argument is that inclusion of the wage-
dispersion variable does not much affect the border coefficient, but
markedly reduces the distance coefficient (while inserting/deleting the
income-dispersion variable into/from (7), changes in the distance coeffi-
cient are similar). As might be supposed, this suggests that the border
variable nearly fully reflects the impact of impediments to trans-border
trade, while the wage-dispersion variable captures the effect of impedi-
ments to intra-country arbitrage within both the USA and Canada.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to directly compare the quantitative results
of Engel and Rogers with ours because of a significant difference in the
construction of the price-dispersion and income-dispersion indicators.
Nevertheless, their results are believed to be circumstantial evidence of
the fact that integration in advanced market economies, also, is not too
close to being perfect. If so, returning to the integration of the Russian
internal market, the situation in Russia is not so disappointing as a com-
parison with the theoretical standard suggests.
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5. CULPRITS BEHIND MARKET FRAGMENTATION
5.1. Potential Culprits
The results reported in Section 4.1 provide more evidence that there are
sufficient and numerous impediments to commodity arbitrage in Russia.
The issue hardly needs detailed consideration, since the literature
discusses it thoroughly and provides a wealth of concrete examples,
e.g., Gardner and Brooks (1994), Berkowitz et al. (1998), Gluschenko
(2001a), etc.
The following generalized factors impeding price equalizing across re-
gions could be listed in addition to transportation and distribution costs:
• organized crime,
• regional protectionism,
• lack of information on arbitrage opportunities,
• institutional reasons (traditions in interregional trade ties and so on),
• regional sale taxes.
State intervention in the economy, i.e., price regulations and subsides,
are credited as being among these factors. However, it seems that,
given the present weakly-integrated Russian consumer market, one can
not say a priori whether such actions do increase inter-regional price
dispersion. It is not inconceivable that nowadays they, quite the contrary,
smooth price disparities to some extent.
Being represented as variables in price regressions, the factors listed
above could explain why differences in local demand give rise to persis-
tent price differences. Unfortunately, all of them are difficult to quantify.
A number of indicators were tried that could be approximates of a por-
tion of the above-stated inter-regional barriers. Additional variables in-
cluded into Equation (7) are as follows.
Shipping conditions. In addition to distance, two variables are adopted
to proxy shipping costs: the quality of the region's transportation infra-
structure and regional freight tariffs. The former is drawn from Mati-
yasevich et al. (1998). This is an index from 0 to 1, such that the larger
the number, the worse the region's transportation infrastructure. The in-
dex is based on the proximity of the region to a non-freezing port,
proximity to a main transportation junction, the average distance be-
tween settlements, the number of road accidents per 100,000 popula-
tion, the number of big airports, the airport capacity, the railway density,
the density of railways in common use, the share of railways with electric
power supply measured by length, car road density, inner water-ways
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density, and the number of large sea ports. The variable for a pair of re-
gions is constructed as the difference of the indices for these regions.
Although the data used to calculate the index are dated to 1996, the in-
dex is believed to be inertial enough and is expanded over the entire
span of time considered, 1992 – 1999.
The regional freight tariff variable is the logarithm of the ratio of the in-
dex of tariffs for freight shipments in regions of the pair. The index is
taken relative to 1991, regional tariffs being supposed to be the same
across all regions at that time. For this calculation, the official yearly in-
dices are used; for 1995 – 1999, they are reported by Goskomstat
(2000a), p. 156 – 157. Hence, the index is the level of freight tariff in the
region at the end of a year (related to a uniform initial level). A potential
source of inaccuracy exists here, since the actual initial values may differ
across regions thus causing biases in the variable values. The second
source of inaccuracy is the fact that the Goskomstat index involves kinds
of transportation which are not used for the delivery of consumer goods,
e.g., air transport, pipeline transport, etc.
Both variables, the infrastructure and the regional freight tariff, are ex-
pected to enter into the regressions with a positive sign.
State intervention in economy. Two variables represent this factor:
price regulations and subsidies. The former is the proportion of goods
and services with regulated prices in the region during the first quarter of
1996; the data source is Goskomstat (probably, not published). The lat-
ter are production subsidies as a proportion of the regional budget ex-
penditures in 1995; this information is from the RECEP (the firstprimary
source is unknown). The relevant pairwise variables are the logarithm of
the ratio of regional indicators. The same values are used for the entire
time span considered. It is very probable that these values were chang-
ing sufficiently during this period. Beyond the years for which the indi-
cators were calculated, they are interpreted as the proxies of the pro-
pensity to price regulating and subsidizing production in the region. But,
of course, such approximation can be the cause of inaccuracies. Since
the subject of price regulations is almost only prices for food, this vari-
able is not included in the regressions of prices for industrial goods.
From the theoretical viewpoint, state intervention should hinder price
equalization across regions, and so, the sign of both variables might be
expected to be positive. However, as it has been stated above, there are
some doubts whether this is always valid in modern Russia. And so, a
negative sign will not be surprising as well.
Shuttle trade (small-scale cross-border informal trade) is an exotic
feature inherent in many transitional economies. Thus, it is very interest-
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ing to clarify its role in market integration. The TACIS (1996) report pro-
vides a quantitative evaluation of the phenomenon by region as shuttle
trade in the region normalized to the average Russian one; the data date
to 1995. The pairwise variable is the logarithm of the ratio between two
regional indices; the same values are expanded to 1992 – 1999, thus
approximating actual values beyond 1995. Since shuttle trade deals with
industrial goods only, the variable is present in the regressions of prices
for such goods, and is absent in regressions of food prices.
It is not clear in advance whether shuttle trade facilitates price equaliza-
tion across regions, or hinders it. On the one hand, more intensive shut-
tle trade in a region can make competition more severe. But on the other
hand, the costs of shuttle trade are rather high; because of this, it may
be that the more intensive shuttle trade, the higher prices. So, the issue
of the sign of the shuttle trade variable is a priori vague.
Organized crime. Two proxies of organized crime are available. The
first is the total crime rate, i.e., the number of registered crimes per
10,000 of the population. The source of (yearly) data is Goskomstat
(1999c), pp. 256 – 257. The crime rate variable is the logarithm of the
ratio of indicators for regions of a pair.
The second proxy describes the economic power of crime as the pro-
portion of the regional economy controlled by criminal groups in 1995 or
1996 (the year is not clear from the source). The proportions across re-
gions were estimated by analysts of Arguments and Facts [Àðãóìåíòû è
ôàêòû] weekly (Kakotkin, 1996) on the basis of data obtained from a
scientific conference on the shadow economy, the Free Economic Soci-
ety, and Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Brown and Earle (2000)
quantify the relevant variable as equaling 1 if criminal groups control
more than 50% of the economy, 0.75 if they control 35 – 50%, 0.5 if
they control 20 – 35%, and 0.25 if they control less than 20%. The pair-
wise variable of the economic power of crime is constructed as the dif-
ference of these values for the regions belonging to the pair. The values
are extrapolated over 1992 – 1999. Such an assumption, probably, is
close to truth in the neighborhood of 1995 – 1996, the years for which
the values are estimated. But clearly, far from these years, the inaccu-
racy of the assumption might turn out to be sizeable.
Correlation between the two measures of organized crime is weak. The
correlation coefficients by year are reported in Table 10.
The correlation has signs varying across years and region samples; it
peaks mainly in 1996. Probably this is just the year for which the eco-
nomic power of crime has been evaluated. Table 10 suggests that the
two proxies of organized crime are far from being similar versions of
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each other. Supposedly, they reflect two different dimensions of organ-
ized crime (both being merely an approximation). The activity of criminal
groups in legal business qualitatively differs from that of ordinary gangs;
when occurring here, crimes as such are much more latent since they
are mainly of economic nature. And so, it does not seem that more eco-
nomic power of crime in a region would necessarily increase the total
number of crimes. Based upon this, both variables are contemporane-
ously included into the regressions.
Table 10. Correlation between the Crime Rate and the Economic Power of Crime.


























































































1992 0.018 –0.011 0.091 0.113 0.061 0.051
1993 0.034 –0.001 0.076 0.118 0.060 0.027
1994 0.035 –0.009 0.036 0.122 0.055 –0.004
1995 –0.017 –0.067 –0.050 0.060 –0.013 –0.103
1996 0.090 0.056 0.095 0.148 0.097 0.078
1997 –0.012 –0.050 –0.015 0.071 0.012 –0.049
1998 –0.014 –0.052 –0.041 0.061 0.004 –0.073
1999 –0.009 –0.032 –0.035 0.056 0.019 –0.059
The issue of the role which organized crime plays in market integration in
Russia is not simple and needs special consideration. The next section
discusses this issue, providing a conceptual framework for interpreting
the empirical results.
5.2. Organized Crime and Prices
Publications in the Russian press during the years of transition provide
countless examples of criminal activity affecting the realm of retail and
wholesale trade. Generalizing, a number of lines of such activity may be
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recognized that eventually impact sales prices. Classified by their eco-
nomic consequences, these are pooled into the following clusters.
The first one includes racketeering retail and wholesale traders, or, as
Berkowitz et al. (1998) gracefully write, collecting "extortion rent." High-
way robberies as well as "tribute" for transporting goods along some
section of a highway and/or for entry into a city also fall into the cluster.
The economic consequence is an increase in the costs of inter- and
intramarket trade (which is shifted to final prices). According to Radayev
(1998), payoff to a criminal group for "protection" against other groups
and individual racketeers — for so called krysha ("roof") — can total
10 – 15% of a businessman's income, but this may be more expensive,
up to 1/3. On the other hand, prevention of racketeering raises costs
as well because of the expenditures for protection and securing one's
business.
Aiming to maintain their "extortion rent," criminal groups block commod-
ity inflows from locations with lower prices (e.g., the fact is well-known
that Moscow "mafia" did not let trucks with vegetables and fruits from
southern regions into the city). This cluster also involves forcing those
traders who bring goods to the city to sell these goods to criminal group
(or to its "under-wardships") at knock-down prices; the goods are then
sold in local markets at much higher prices. The economic consequence
is restriction of arbitrage.
To maintain "extortion rent," criminal groups also force traders not to
lower prices below a "prescribed" floor. In some cases, traders them-
selves order such actions, thus preventing their competitors from under-
cutting their prices. The economic consequence is the restriction of in-
tra-market price competition.
The forth cluster relates to goods which come in very large lots. There
is information that wholesale trade in gasoline (and, maybe, in sugar)
is controlled by organized crime in some cities. "Shadow" monopoly
(if virtual control belongs to one criminal group) or cartel collusion (if
there are a few groups) enables prices for a good in a city to be syn-
chronously raised, at the same time blocking the supply of this good
through other channels. One more realm of machinations here is food
purchases by local (regional) administrations at overstated prices. Such
actions are carried out by corrupted officials in "co-operation" with
criminal groups (most often, this concerns grain, large lots of which
promise huge profits; clearly this results in high prices for the final goods
produced from it, e.g., bread). The economic significance of this cluster
is withdrawal — usually, with surplus — of the intermarket price differ-
ence; the consequence is a rise in local prices (which is not eliminated
by arbitrage).
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Hence organized crime objectively counteracts the integration of the
Russian consumer market by both creating direct barriers to arbitrage
and increasing arbitrage transaction costs, thus hindering the conver-
gence of prices across regions. Therefore it should be expected that the
higher the organized crime rate is in a region, the higher are prices
there.
It needs to be noted, however, that there is one more cluster of criminal
activity, the potential economic consequence of which has the opposite
effect, that is, it facilitates competition and reduces prices. The case in
hand is the illegal production of (surrogate) vodka and contraband im-
port. To what extent might this change the conclusion drawn?
When fake vodka is produced on a large scale, it is delivered through le-
gal channels.5 Once entering into the trade network, this vodka is then
distributed as any ordinary (legal) good, including to other regions as
well (e.g., it is known that "Absolut" vodka was not exported to Russia
during a few years, nevertheless, it — clearly, fake — was sold all over
the country).6 In former times, illegal vodka was sold in retail trade at
noticeably lower prices than the legal one. However, in the recent years,
after control over the circulation of alcoholic products has been toughen,
licensing for trade in alcohol has been introduced, and selling of vodka in
kiosks has been prohibited, fake vodka is sold at the same prices as
genuine vodka (in order not to attract the attention of law-enforcement
and controlling bodies), and price competition with legal producers oc-
curs almost only on the wholesale level.
In the case that illegal vodka is supplied by a producer (or by his mid-
dleman) directly to shops, he is interested not in increasing the quantity
of sales in each shop due to lower retail prices but in entering additional
retail enterprises since this provides a much higher rise in income. Nor
do such shops have the stimuli for price competition as gains from an
increase in sales is incomparably (by orders of value) less than the profit
itself from substituting genuine vodka for fake vodka. It is not inconceiv-
able that illegal vodka is supplied to a shop by one criminal group, but
the "roof" is provided by another. However, even though such shops
                                               
5 Underground trade in surrogate vodka (at very low prices) belongs predomi-
nantly to the realm of "gray economy" rather than to that of organized crime.
Usually this takes place in the situation in which elementary small-scale produc-
tion is organized by individuals or small groups of "underground businessmen."
6 Because of this, the repeat certification of alcoholic beverages, which is estab-
lished in some regions, not only has protectionist aims but also seeks to keep
fake vodka (both imported from other regions and domestically produced) from
entering the market.
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have some "privileges" from organized crime, others selling genuine
vodka (or even fake vodka but delivered from another region so that a
shop might be in ignorance of its origin) can experience the above-
described criminal pressure. Hence the impact of organized crime on
prices may be oppositely directed.7 Although a priory the eventual "re-
sultant" cannot be determined, it is felt that, most probably, the increase
in prices is more than considerable.
Contraband import should reduce prices. But it is hardly probable that
this effect could be localized on the level of a single region. For example,
favorable substances of contraband in Russia are cigarettes (until 1999),
alcoholic beverages, and consumer electronics. However, these goods
are imported illegally in giant lots, and so, the goods are distributed
throughout the entire country. Even if the lots are relatively small, their
size, nevertheless, is usually too large for a single city (region), and the
contraband goods are distributed throughout a number of neighboring
regions. For example, contraband of mass consumption goods from
China is monopolized in Novosibirsk by one criminal group. But Novo-
sibirsk merely serves as a large terminal station for these goods which
are then delivered to other Siberian regions (Tomilina, 2000). Most likely,
contraband facilitates the reduction of prices on the level of the whole
country rather than on that of single regions.
Thus, we would expect the coefficient on each variable representing or-
ganized crime to be positive (except, maybe, regressions of the price for
vodka).
5.3. Empirical Results
The results on the impact of the potential culprits on price dispersion are
presented for panels (cross-sectional results are reported if data are
available only for a single year); being cumbersome, detailed estimates
by year are not reported. Because some data for 1992 are lacking, this
year is omitted from the panels. Table 11 summarizes the results on
commodity aggregates, the baskets of 19 and 25 foods as well as spatial
price indices for foodstuff and industrial goods. Estimates for individual
goods are reported in the electronic version of the paper.
                                               
7 It should be mentioned that the "positive" role of organized crime may escape
the official statistics. For the statistical observation of the prices for vodka, 6 rep-
resentatives are used: home vodka of ordinary quality (such as "Russkaya",
"Moskovskaya"), that of higher quality (such as "Posol’skaya", "Pshenichnaya"),
and imported vodka (such as "Finlandia", "Absolut"). If fake vodka bears other
brands, a price registration misses it (to say nothing of underground sales).
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Basket of 25 food goods, 1993 – 1999
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Adding variables that are supposed to be responsible for market frag-
mentation, the dependence of the price differential on the income differ-
ential weakens. However, it very rarely becomes insignificant, and this
occurs only when one deals with individual goods (on the other hand, β
for them rises sometime). Hence, there are extra barriers fencing Rus-
sian regions off each other; such a result might be expected (also worthy
of mention is a very rough approximation of a number of variables). Let
us consider the results of specific variables, taking them in the same or-
der as in Section 5.1.
Shipping conditions. Transportation infrastructure has mainly the ex-
pected positive sign, accounting for a sufficient share of price dispersion
in many instances if the case in hand is all regions. The variable be-
comes insignificant in 3 cases out of 4 when difficult-to-access regions
are eliminated. Dealing with European Russia, negative estimates ap-
pear; they are numerous for individual goods. A possible reason may be
the poor approximation yielded by the index adopted. Referring to the
composition of the infrastructure index described in Section 5.1, it is ob-
vious that a lot of components are involved in the index which are irrele-
vant to the delivery of goods, but can cause a sufficient difference in the
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variable value across regions. The relationship between price dispersion
and regional freight tariff is positive (though not always).
State intervention in economy. Both variables unless insignificant al-
ways have a negative effect on price dispersion. Thus, price regulations
and subsidies narrow inter-regional price gaps, so acting in favor of price
convergence. For specific goods, the pattern is mixed. However, as for
subsidies, the negative effect prevails, e.g., taking place in 70% of the
estimations for food goods.
Shuttle trade. Shuttle trade has a positive effect on the price difference
on both the aggregated and disaggregated levels (the exception is pro-
vided by three goods, for all of which the estimates are cross-sectional
rather than panel ones). Hence, this primitive form of trade has a para-
doxical impact on market integration; the more intensive is the shuttle
trade in a region, the higher prices are there. However, this is of no sur-
prise if one takes into account that shuttle trade is, in fact, arbitrage
between foreign countries and the region rather than between this region
and other Russian regions. Because of the high trade costs, goods im-
ported by "shuttles" push prices up. But this is not always the case.
Organized crime. As it follows from Table 11, organized crime is re-
sponsible for a significant share of price dispersion. Not infrequently,
both proxies of organized crime are contemporarily significant. This cor-
roborates the above stated assumption that these proxies describe two
different dimensions of organized crime (however, they both indirectly
characterize those lines of criminal activity that affect inter-regional price
dispersion.) At the same time, the division of organized crime between
two variables has a disadvantage that we have no information about the
total impact of organized crime on market fragmentation. Therefore,
some combined measure is desirable, which would join the crime rate
and economic power of crime. The construction of a proper joint variable
will be the subject of further work.
Referring to individual goods, both variables of organized crime are, too,
contemporaneously significant in many instances. But there are cases of
a negative relationship (though, they are present in Table 11 as well).
With a sole exception, they occur when short panels of one to three re-
cent years are dealt with. This provides some grounds to attribute the
cases of negative sign to accidental reasons. As for the exception men-
tioned, there may be another story. The good under consideration is
vodka, which has a negative relationship between the price differential,
and one variable of organized crime, namely, the economic power of
crime. It is not inconceivable that this fact is evidence of the decreasing
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dispersion of prices for vodka under the impact of organized crime in
1993 – 1995.
The feature that is seen from the results for individual goods is that the
dependence of price dispersion on organized crime weakens over the
1997 – 1999 panel as against the 1993 – 1995 panel. This reflects the
temporal pattern of the organized crime effect. Not reported cross-
sectional regressions by year provide evidence that the impact of crime
is strengthening during the early years of transition, and then is de-
creasing. The maximum effect of crime on prices falls into the interval of
approximately 1993 – 1995. Being estimated over the panel of price-25
in the same manner as for β (see Section 4.1), the trend factor is signifi-
cant and negative for both variables. It ranges across region samples
from –0.043 to –0.025 for the crime rate, and from –0.024 to –0.019 for
the economic power of crime, European Russia having the lowest abso-
lute values.
Such a finding seems to be rather surprising. However, analyzing the
data of a number of sociological surveys, Radayev (1998) finds the same
feature in the evolution of crime in Russia. He suggests the following
reasons for narrowing the "realm of organized force": the ending of the
era of "fast money", the division of spheres of influence, strengthening
care (of crime and business which uses its "services") for own security,
the shift of crime to "white" and "gray" market segments.8 This does not
mean that organized crime steps back; it just transforms itself, that is,
the opposition of crime and business is changing to the interosculation.
Both the intuitive considerations in Section 5.2 and the empirical results
above suggest that organized crime hinders market integration. But
there is another result that seemingly conflicts with these results. Using
the economic power of crime as a variable, Brown and Earle (2000) find
organized crime to increase the positive effect of competition. In light of
the observations on Russian reality, this seems quite astonishing. One
could conclude herefrom that organized crime facilitates the reduction of
market fragmentation. Is this really the case? Is Brown – Earle's finding
in conflict with that of the current study, or can these be reconciled?
This paper considers consumer goods. Till the crisis of 1998, the pro-
duction of most of these brought low profit (if any). Therefore criminal
groups did not show interest in the usurpation of control over the pro-
duction of such goods, preferring to act as parasites in the trade of
                                               
8 "The time when risky money, big and fast, was made is over. Nowadays this is a
routine, a complex and hard job; no superprofit is here, and where it lacks, extor-
tioners do not intrude there", — cites Radayev (p. 60) his respondent.
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these goods. Competitive, successfully working enterprises, control over
which might provide high gains, were attractive for criminal groups. Such
(again, till the 1998 crisis) were mostly enterprises that worked — directly
or indirectly — for export. It was just such enterprises that were above all
the subjects of organized crime intrusion9 (the results of Brown and
Earle, which had they been presented by sector, they could shed more
light upon the issue of the direction of this intrusion; unfortunately, their
paper reports only data aggregated over the entire industry).
Thus, even if organized crime facilitates competition, there are no
grounds to anticipate its positive impact on the integration of the con-
sumer market, as this is just corroborated by the use of Brown – Earle's
measure for organized crime within the framework of this study. What is
more, one hardly might expect that the effect found by them relates to
the increase of price competition in the internal market at all.
Then what does their finding imply? As a dependent variable, Brown and
Earle use the output an enterprise produced. The competition measure
("competitive pressure") of interest to us is an index reflecting the de-
concentration degree of both inter- and intra-regional product markets.
A positive relationship between these two variables means that the less
concentrated the market is, the more productive are enterprises working
in it. When the combined impact of competition and organized crime
(being represented by the product of these variables) is taken into ac-
count, the relationship becomes considerably stronger. Brown and Earle
explain this by the fact that criminal groups (controlling enterprises) can
compete against one another, and that they can facilitate the delivery of
goods, both by cutting through the bureaucratic red tape and by pro-
tecting the goods from robbers.
Possibly, this does occur, but the essentials seem to be other. First, the
causality may be opposite, that is, organized crime does not facilitate the
productivity of enterprise, but vice versa; the more successfully an en-
terprise works, the more attractive it is for criminal groups, and so, the
more chances it has to fall under criminal control. Second, a criminal
group, indeed, may facilitate the productivity of enterprise with its spe-
cific means: contraband export of production, escaping taxes, getting
various preferences and/or overpriced purchase orders from corrupted
officials, etc. Third, organized crime can increase the competition meas-
ure itself, in particular, by forming a great number of intermediary
(though registered as manufacturing) firms "around" a controlled enter-
prise, these firms aiming to hide an enterprise's profit from taxation, to
                                               
9 Probably, the situation changed after 1998. However, no information which
could give an idea of evolution of "sectoral interests" of organized crime in recent
years has been found.
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launder capitals (portions of which is used for legal investments), to
perform unlawful foreign-trade operations, etc.
Thus, counteraction to market integration and (seeming or real) streng-
thening of the positive effect of competition that are caused by the activ-
ity of organized crime do not at all contend against one another, but
peacefully coexist; moreover, these intensify one another to a certain
extent. And so, an increase in competition in the case in question (i.e., in
its "criminal part") does not in the least reduce the fragmentation of the
Russian regional markets.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, an approach to examining market integration is proposed
that consists of the analysis of the relationship between price dispersion
and income differences across locations. Having been applied to diverse
price data across Russian regions, the approach has proved its worth as a
fruitful tool for analysis. Empirical findings accord well with the practical
evidence. On the other hand, the obtained temporal pattern of Russian
market integration roughly conforms, though not fully, with the pattern
provided by the study of Berkowitz and DeJong (2001), who use quite an-
other methodology. So, it may be argued that the strength of the price-
income relationship is a good measure of internal market fragmentation.
On frequent occasions, even simple regressions of price on only income
identifies indications of poor integration. Certainly, the lack of a relation-
ship between price and income differences is not a sufficient condition for
the fulfillment of the law of one price (like occurrence of the dependence
of price dispersion on distance), but this is its necessary condition. Need-
less to say, it would be highly interesting and desirable to apply the  pro-
posed approach to some advanced market economies. First, it is intriguing
how the methodology will work with a market which is a priori taken as in-
tegrated. Second, quantitative results would provide the reference point
for transitional economies, primarily, for the Russian one.
Empirical results themselves suggest that it is premature to label the Rus-
sian economic space as "single." When natural impediments to market
integration, such as distances and difficult-to-access territories, as well as
differences in local distribution costs are controlled for, the pattern some-
what improves, but nonetheless it demonstrates that there are sufficient
"artificial" barriers to inter-regional trade.
Alongside with these, indications of improvement in market integration can
be seen. The fragmentation measure tends to decrease with time; the in-
ter-regional barriers seem to become lower in recent years. This provides
hope that the Russian internal market is moving towards integration. Un-
fortunately, the movement is slow and not steady.
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APPENDICES
A. Distribution Costs of Retail Trade
Component of Costs 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Percentage of retail sales
Total 15.4 17.6 17.5 21.9 21.1 21.1*
Material costs 2.3 3.1 3.6 3.9 3.5 3.5
Among them: local shipping NA NA NA 1.2 1.1 0.8
fuel and electricity 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.2 1.3
Wage and wage taxes 5.8 7.5 7.0 10.0 10.1 10.0
Among them: wage 4.6 5.5 5.4 7.4 7.5 7.4
wage taxes 1.2 2.0 1.6 2.6 2.7 2.6
Amortization 0.1 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.9 0.8
Other costs 7.3 6.6 6.3 6.9 6.5 6.8
Among them: rents 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.1
Percentage of total
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Material costs 14.9 17.6 20.7 17.9 16.7 16.4
Among them: local shipping NA NA NA 5.5 5.0 3.8
fuel and electricity 2.6 3.4 4.6 5.8 5.8 5.6
Wage and wage taxes 37.7 42.6 40.2 45.8 48.0 47.3
Among them: wage 29.9 31.2 31.0 33.9 35.4 35.1
wage taxes 7.8 11.4 9.2 11.9 12.6 12.2
Amortization 0.6 2.3 2.9 4.7 4.3 4.0
Other costs 47.4 37.5 36.2 31.6 31.0 32.2
Among them: rents 2.6 3.4 4.6 3.6 4.6 5.3
* The value for 1997 is used.
Sources: Goskomstat (1996b), p. 32; Goskomstat (1998d), p. 64; Goskomstat (1999d), p. 69.
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B. Composition and Structure










1 Rye-and-wheat bread kg 92 68.7
2 White bread kg 86.7 62.9
3 Flour kg — 19.5
4 Rice kg — 3.7
5 Millet kg 18.1 9.8
6 Vermicelli kg 7.3 5.2
7 Potatoes kg 146 124.2
8 Cabbages kg 29.8 28.1
9 Carrots kg — 37.5
10 Onions kg 10.2 28.4
11 Apples kg 11 19.4
12 Sugar kg 24.8 20.7
13 Beef kg 42 8.4
14 Poultry-meat kg — 17.5
15 Boiled sausage kg 2.2 0.45
16 Boiled-and-smoked
sausage kg 1.1 0.35
17 Frozen fish kg — 11.7
18 Milk l 184.3 123.1
19 Sour cream kg 4.2 1.6
20 Butter kg 3.6 2.5
21 Curd kg — 9.9
22 Cheese kg 2 2.3
23 Eggs piece 183 151.4
24 Margarine kg — 3.9
25 Vegetable oil kg 10 6.4
26 Cigarettes pack 96 —
Source: Goskomstat (1998b), p. 428.
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C. Retail-Wholesale Margin vs. Food Basket Costs
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RWM — retail-wholesale margin.
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D. Retail-Wholesale Margin vs. Spatial Price Indices




1997:1 1998:1 1997:1 1998:1
Model with the retail-wholesale margin variable

















































































Model with index cleared of retail-wholesale margin
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E. Individual Food Goods
Table E1. Standard Deviations of Price Differentials of Individual Food Goods.
Good 1992 1993 1994 1995 1997 1998 1999
All regions (2701 observations)
Beef 0.387 0.463 0.569 0.375 0.275 0.319 0.225
Milk 0.879 0.757 0.460 0.475 0.385 0.379 0.378
Eggs 0.463 0.397 0.288 0.329 0.259 0.292 0.258
Frozen fish — — — — 0.297 0.372 0.287
Sugar 0.484 0.178 0.221 0.222 0.206 0.280 0.176
Vegetable oil 0.552 0.452 0.544 0.407 — 0.293 0.168
Potatoes 0.596 0.677 0.550 0.395 0.424 0.425 0.295
White bread 0.661 0.633 0.482 0.511 0.359 0.381 0.285
Flour — — — — — 0.339 0.222
Rice — — — — — 0.257 0.173
Vermicelli — — — — — 0.291 0.286
Butter 0.503 0.287 0.555 0.189 0.160 0.218 0.185
Boiled sausage 0.531 0.293 0.359 0.216 — — —
Vodka 0.409 0.298 0.357 0.350 — — —
Excluding difficult-to-access regions (2346 observations)
Beef 0.341 0.374 0.440 0.288 0.189 0.253 0.161
Milk 0.859 0.731 0.514 0.446 0.315 0.313 0.310
Eggs 0.445 0.383 0.240 0.224 0.168 0.230 0.201
Frozen fish — — — — 0.282 0.362 0.259
Sugar 0.497 0.153 0.193 0.162 0.169 0.271 0.145
Vegetable oil 0.498 0.449 0.498 0.260 — 0.282 0.154
Potatoes 0.489 0.625 0.494 0.332 0.346 0.365 0.272
White bread 0.668 0.615 0.431 0.446 0.265 0.295 0.253
Flour — — — — — 0.266 0.175
Rice — — — — — 0.257 0.171
Vermicelli — — — — — 0.242 0.267
Butter 0.506 0.389 0.561 0.170 0.138 0.207 0.164
Boiled sausage 0.527 0.211 0.292 0.180 — — —
Vodka 0.376 0.246 0.333 0.309 — — —
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Continued from p. 67
Good 1992 1993 1994 1995 1997 1998 1999
European Russia (1275 observations)
Beef 0.346 0.322 0.411 0.227 0.130 0.237 0.137
Milk 0.846 0.704 0.530 0.418 0.231 0.282 0.278
Eggs 0.419 0.381 0.234 0.168 0.095 0.231 0.139
Frozen fish — — — — 0.264 0.347 0.269
Sugar 0.449 0.125 0.186 0.129 0.113 0.294 0.125
Vegetable oil 0.479 0.435 0.460 0.224 — 0.290 0.148
Potatoes 0.484 0.606 0.434 0.331 0.295 0.365 0.220
White bread 0.674 0.610 0.373 0.457 0.243 0.284 0.251
Flour — — — — — 0.249 0.187
Rice — — — — — 0.280 0.128
Vermicelli — — — — — 0.232 0.282
Butter 0.517 0.315 0.423 0.175 0.106 0.223 0.158
Boiled sausage 0.583 0.177 0.217 0.159 — — —
Vodka 0.401 0.235 0.316 0.302 — — —
Table E2. Impact of Income and Distance on Prices of Individual Food Goods.
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Continued from p. 68
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Continued from p.69
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Continued from p.70
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Continued from p.71
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F. Individual Industrial Goods
Table F1. Standard Deviations of Price Differentials of Individual Industrial Goods.
Good 1997 1998 1999
All regions (2701 observations)
Men's trousers — 0.283 0.338
Shirts 0.296 0.321 0.329
Women's blouses — 0.290 0.301
Skirts — 0.361 0.346
Jumpers, sweaters 0.282 0.282 0.341
Gasoline 0.189 0.202 0.161
Children's jackets 0.309 — —
Children's boots 0.258 — —
Filter cigarettes 0.191 — —
Excluding difficult-to-access regions (2346 observations)
Men's trousers — 0.274 0.318
Shirts 0.282 0.310 0.313
Women's blouses — 0.294 0.302
Skirts — 0.362 0.332
Jumpers, sweaters 0.268 0.274 0.340
Gasoline 0.140 0.142 0.137
Children's jackets 0.296 — —
Children's boots 0.255 — —
Filter cigarettes 0.183 — —
European Russia (1275 observations)
Men's trousers — 0.269 0.309
Shirts 0.306 0.313 0.301
Women's blouses — 0.312 0.322
Skirts — 0.383 0.351
Jumpers, sweaters 0.286 0.285 0.312
Gasoline 0.112 0.129 0.147
Children's jackets 0.246 — —
Children's boots 0.253 — —
Filter cigarettes 0.167 — —
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Table F2. Impact of Income and Distance on Prices of Individual Industrial Goods.
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Continued from p.74














































































































APPENDICES (NOT INCLUDED IN THE PRINTED VERSION) 76
Continued from p.75
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G. Prices vs. Various Factors







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Crime power — Economic power of crime.
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Men's trousers, 1998 – 1999









































































































Women's blouses, 1998 – 1999
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